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The Importance of Education Systems in Post-Conflict Settings: 
The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) 
By Emily Coles1 
Abstract 
 
This paper considers how education systems in post-conflict settings impact 
reconstruction processes using the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) as an example. Three 
separate literatures are reviewed: post-conflict settings/reconstruction, reconciliation, and 
education systems. The paper analyzes the transitions, security, political, social and economic, 
which characterize post-conflict settings and reconstruction and argues that they must occur 
consequentially. Additionally, post-conflict reconstruction must always include both short and 
long-term goals in the peace agreement and provide for development of local capacity. In BiH 
these transitions were incomplete. The placement of a constitution in the peace agreement, 
without provisions for its revision, has also led to political gridlock. Reconciliation is then 
discussed as a central component of reconstruction. In the case of BiH, even though it has been 
15 years since the conflict, reconciliation has not occurred and the society remains polarized 
according to the three ethnicities. The role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in promoting reconciliation is criticized and indicators of the continued 
presence of ethnic tensions are reviewed. Lastly, the role of education systems in post-conflict 
reconstruction is discussed. Because education can play a critical role in reconciliation, and in 
reconstruction, education should be mandated in any peace agreement. Since education was not 
considered in the Dayton Peace Accords, the education system in BiH remains divided and this is 
impeding reconciliation. It is argued that, if education is not emphasized as a key component in 
peace agreements, then divided education systems will continue to prevent successful 
reconciliation, which in turn hinders the long-term success of reconstruction efforts. 
                                                        
1
 During the summer of 2010, I was an intern at the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). While I 
was there, I conducted fieldwork on the education system of BiH. I interviewed members of the government, 
officials at various NGOs and IOs, and students. As a result of these interviews, I was driven to continue this 
research once I returned to my university. This paper is the result. I would like to thank especially the students, the 
Embassy officials who supported my project, UNICEF Sarajevo, OSCE Sarajevo, SHL Sarajevo, and the professors 
who guided me along the way. 
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I. Introduction 
 
“Honestly, right now the bigger problem would be that in certain areas all students go together to 
school, because even today there is hatred between Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs ... While that 
hatred exists, I think that it is better that schools be segregated, because only bigger problems 
will arise ... When the hatred disappears, and I hope that that will happen soon, then all of us will 
be able to be under the same roof and enjoy a mutual life. Or maybe we'll go for all or nothing 
and say that everyone goes to the same school and hopefully after a short period of time we will 
make friends and realize that we are all humans and not animals!” 
       - Anonymous2 Bosnian High School Student 
a. Background 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) experienced a bloody civil war from 1992-1995. Ethnic 
cleansing occurred across the country as each of the three ethnic groups, Bosnian Serbs, 
Bosniacs, and Bosnian Croats, sought to gain control over regions of the country. The ethnic 
cleansing campaign was initiated by the former President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and 
subsequently carried out in BiH by Radovan Karadzic, former President of the self-proclaimed 
Serb Republic, and Ratko Mladic, leader of the Bosnian Serb army. However, all ethnic groups 
were complicit in committing war crimes. This is one of the reasons the war is often cited as the 
one of the most complicated in history. In 2007, the death toll was estimated to have been 97,207. 
This number has continued to increase as newly discovered graves have been exhumed. The 
death toll is just one component of the price paid by this country and its citizens. Displacement 
of over 2.2 million persons was a key method of ethnic cleansing in addition to the brutal raping 
of many women, which was later deemed to constitute a war crime according to international law. 
The war left a lasting mark on the citizens and the infrastructure of the country. While efforts 
were taken to move BiH forward to a prosperous future, this process has been lengthy and 
marked with several failures.  
The author chose the subject of this honors research thesis after hearing stories from 
several Bosnian students in the summer of 2010. A high school student described a soccer match 
in which a friend came to him and said that he could no longer stay on the field. Pointing to a 
player on the other team, his friend said: “You see that kid over there? His father killed my father 
during the war.” The student could not handle being on the field and decided to leave. He was 
attending a ‘two schools under one roof’ system, where students are segregated according to 
                                                        
2
 The identity of this student has been concealed. 
 7
their ethnicity. Given this kind of situation, the question becomes how can ethnic and religious 
divisions so colored by emotions be broken down? Additionally, how can education be a tool to 
promote inter-generational reconciliation? While the role of education in influencing attitudes of 
students may be poorly understood, it is possible that the segregated school system produces 
students who not only have no memory of the past, but also grow up to use force to secure 
political goals.3 Insufficient attention has been given to the roles of education and reconciliation, 
and their inter-relationship, in post-conflict reconstruction processes. As a result, there are 
generations of students who hold the same prejudices as their parents even though they 
themselves did not directly experience the war. The author has sought to understand this and 
other components to BiH’s post-conflict reconstruction process.  
b. Executive Summary 
 
This paper constructs a model for the role of education in promoting successful 
reconstruction in post-conflict settings. It explores three topics and then applies each to the case 
of BiH, concluding with a model, which explains how the education system is key to successful 
reconstruction. The model is also used to characterize the current situation in BiH. Using the 
analysis of the different causes for conflict described by Smith, and Weinstein and Harvey, the 
paper considers the range of post-conflict settings. Menkhaus argues that there is no universal 
template for post-conflict settings, but that one can find some common characteristics. The 
article by Brown, Langer and Stewart and the book by Wolff describe these characteristics. 
Davies has found that post-conflict settings can be defined according to phases and transitions. In 
this paper, the UNDP Report and the UNDP, UNDG and WB Practical Guide to post-conflict 
settings were used to define four of these transitions as these organizations typically play an 
active role in post-conflict reconstruction. 
Wolff considers the defining characteristics of a successful post-conflict reconstruction 
process. According to del Castillo, this is accomplished according to four transitions: security, 
political, social and economic. The paper argues that these transitions are consequential rather 
than sequential; that is, each transition can affect and be affected by every other transition.  
Del Castillo considers UN mandated reconstruction and places the peace agreement as 
the most important tool for determining how the reconstruction process will proceed. In 
                                                        
3
 This conclusion was based on an interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 1/27/11.  
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particular, the peace agreement must contain both short-term and long-term goals for 
reconstruction. For example while a temporary constitution may be needed in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict, consideration for a permanent constitution must be included in the 
initial planning. Wolff describes the risk involved when the capacity of the local population is 
not developed and when long-term goals are not acknowledged at the beginning of the 
reconstruction process.  
The paper then applies these ideas to the case of BiH by analyzing the Dayton Peace 
Accords (DPA).4 After reviewing each component of the accords, the paper discusses the 
successes and failures of the peace agreement. Simonsen and Aitken show how the 
characterization of the conflict as an ethnic civil war increased the political salience of ethnicity. 
Thus, according to Torsti, Zagar, and Aitken, wartime divisions were institutionalized through 
the DPA. Furthermore, the DPA did not plan for constitutional reform after the country had been 
stabilized. The paper concludes that the DPA failed to promote successful reconstruction because 
it did not develop local capacity nor did it consider long-term goals in the short-term.  
The paper then addresses the broad subject of reconciliation and its relationship to 
reconstruction, using the definition of reconciliation provided by Magill, Smith and Hamber. 
Weinstein and Stover analyze the effectiveness of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) 
and international courts as mechanisms to promote reconciliation. The relationship between 
reconciliation and other reconstruction processes is then considered. 
The state of reconciliation in BiH is then reviewed beginning with an analysis of the role 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The international 
community implemented the ICTY as a mechanism to promote reconciliation. Various sources 
are cited that emphasize that the ICTY was distanced from the local community and thus did not 
promote local reconciliation. The ICTY also missed a critical opportunity to bring reconciliation 
to the families of victims by ignoring the importance of individual identification in the 
exhumation process. Furthermore, Clark claims that the ICTY was not universally accepted and 
thus failed to promote reconciliation. The paper then analyzes key indicators in BiH that show an 
absence of reconciliation.   
 The last broad analysis concerns the question of the impact of education on reconciliation 
and reconstruction. As Perry argues, early socialization experiences are important to the 
                                                        
4
 The formal title of the DPA is the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).  
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formation of ethnic attitudes. Nikolai and Dupuy highlight the importance of addressing 
education systems in peace agreements and Trnavcevic suggests that education can actually 
contribute to several critical reconstruction processes. To summarize, the paper refers to Perry’s 
characterization of the role of education in post-conflict settings and then argues that education 
impacts economic recovery, development of civil society and the reduction of ethnic tensions.  
 To support the claim that education can play a key role in shaping reconciliation, the 
paper analyzes the education system in post-conflict Northern Ireland (NI). Hayes and 
McAllister, and Gallagher, all point out that reform of the education system in NI was 
specifically designed to address reconciliation in the aftermath of the war. Bozic suggests that 
continued segregation in schools can reinforce ethnic tensions and Gallagher concludes that this 
has perpetuated divisions. Finally, Hayes and McAllister propose that education should be a key 
element to breaking down community divisions in post-conflict societies.  
 The paper then analyzes the education sector in BiH by using ideas presented by Bozic, 
Chivvis and Dogo, Torsti, Perry, OSCE, and Kreso. Several other aspects of the education sector 
are examined: its history, how the DPA incorporated education, the international community’s 
involvement in the sector, and indicators of segregation and division. Lastly, the obstacles to 
integrated education and educational reform are assessed.  
 The failure of the DPA to provide long-term plans for the education system, and the 
continued existence of segregated and divided schools in BiH has contributed to the failure of 
reconciliation and, in turn, to the failure of the reconstruction process. The paper concludes with 
some suggestions for the future.  
II. Post-Conflict Settings and Reconstruction 
 
 This section reviews the characteristics of post-conflict settings. The way in which 
reconstruction takes place within these types of settings is then discussed. The discussion ends 
with the conclusion that post-conflict reconstruction takes place in a number of phases and 
transitions that occur consequentially. It is argued that the success of post-conflict reconstruction 
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depends on the combination of short-term goals with a long-term plan in addition to addressing 
the relationship between the international community5 and the development of local capacity.  
a. Post-Conflict Settings 
 
The causes for the conflict, the duration of the conflict and the parties involved, make 
each post-conflict setting unique. According to Smith, there are political, economic and socio-
cultural explanations for why conflict occurs (20). Political explanations deal with the conflict 
between political ideologies for power. Conflict can also arise because of poverty or because of 
the struggle for economic control, i.e. resource wars. Lastly, socio-cultural factors can lead to 
conflict. In the case of ethnic conflict, Kaufman argues that “myths that justify war, fear of 
annihilation, and opportunity for action” all serve as a catalyst for conflict (qtd. in Weinstein and 
Harvey 16).  
For these reasons, it is difficult to characterize a “typical” post-conflict setting according 
to its cause. The term itself is controversial. It is challenging to distinguish between conflict and 
post-conflict settings because they do not have strict definitions but rather are defined according 
to ‘phases and transitions’ (Davies 230). Additionally, there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
post-conflict settings (Brown, Langer and Stewart 3). As Menkhaus has argued, “there is a near–
universal consensus that post-conflict situations vary too much to permit a pre-determined, fixed 
‘template’ for evaluation” (10). However, it is still possible to make comparisons and 
generalizations. For example, Wolff claims that all immediate post-conflict settings are marked 
with a “lack of functioning or legitimate political institutions, weak economic performance, non-
existent or polarized structures of civil society, and antagonized elites” (Wolff 158). Brown, 
Langer and Stewart expand on this generalization by framing post-conflict settings according to 
various characteristics: (1) human resources are low, as the educated populations tend to flee 
during the conflict; (2) social expenditures have also been disrupted; (3) with no tax revenue, 
states rely heavily on international donations to support the recovery; (4) populations have 
typically suffered psychological trauma that impacts recovery; (5) there can also be physical 
damage to the population including disability and death by landmines; (6) infectious disease is 
                                                        
5
 The term ‘international community’ will refer to different agencies depending on particular situations. However, in 
general, it refers to organizations and individual states involved in the reconstruction process. These typically 
include UN organizations, International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and individual 
states.  
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often rampant; (7) unemployment is also common; and (8) all of these impact the likelihood for 
conflict to return (4-6).  
As noted above, post-conflict settings can be defined according to phases and transitions 
(Davies 230). There are several markers that show progress, or the lack thereof, towards 
recovery from a devastating civil war. One marker is the signing of a peace agreement. 
According to Wolff, peace agreements “do not resolve conflicts – at best they provide a 
framework in which conflicting goals can be accommodated and pursued by means other than 
political violence” (Wolff 155). Founded on the idea of compromise, peace agreements strive to 
set the tone for warring parties to cooperate. More immediately, however, peace agreements end 
the violence. Other transition milestones are demobilization, disarmament and reintegration 
(DDR) programs, refugee repatriation, establishing a functioning state, achieving reconciliation 
and societal integration, and economic recovery (Brown, Langer and Stewart 5). This is the ideal 
post-conflict progression, one that is seldom realized in its entirety. It is important to emphasize 
that these transitions are not sequential processes but rather consequential. This means that they 
can occur simultaneously and affect each other during post-conflict reconstruction. 
The UNDP has defined four transition periods that characterize this progression, the first 
of which is ‘early recovery’. According to an UNDP policy paper, “early recovery is the 
interface at which humanitarian, development and, possible peacekeeping partners co-exist and 
interact” (5). This is the place where planning the transition from relief based assistance to long-
term recovery takes place. While the two processes, humanitarian relief, that is securing basic 
necessities, and long-term assistance programs may overlap, it is important that there is a long-
term reconstruction plan. According to UNDP, the role of the international community in early 
recovery is as follows: strengthening post-crisis governance by increasing local capacity, 
facilitating effective local level recovery by tailoring to the unique situation, and creating a 
coordinating body to assist with early assessment, analysis and coordination. It is here, during 
‘early recovery,’ where individuals affected by war start to look for ways to rebuild their lives. 
Therefore, it is imperative that long-term planning begins here, immediately after the conflict has 
ended. As stated in the report, “from the outset it is vital to support, sustain, and begin to rebuild 
the essential national and local capacities necessary for longer-term success” (UNDP 7).  
The ‘early recovery’ programs are foundational in nature (UNDP 32). This means they 
create stability and build capacity so that future recovery programs focusing more on social, 
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political and economic factors can be realized. If executed properly, this phase also contributes to 
the reduction in the risk of the state returning to conflict by establishing trust in, and ownership 
of, the peace process (UNDP 13). 
The Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) initiative describes the remaining three 
phases. This document was co-authored by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the 
World Bank (WB), and the UN Development Group (UNDG), agencies that have played key 
roles in post-conflict settings. The first of these is the ‘stabilization/transition phase’ which is 
marked by establishing security, political and macroeconomic frameworks, consolidation of a 
civil service, restoration of central infrastructure and services, meeting humanitarian needs, 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and trust building between former 
conflicting parties (UNDP, UNDG and WB 6). This phase is supposed to last for the first 12 
months after the signing of a peace agreement. The second phase is described as 
‘transformation/institution building’. It includes political, economic, judicial, and security sector 
reforms, institution capacity building, DDR, restoration of important infrastructure and 
productive capacities, extension of essential services, social safety nets, food security, continued 
return of refugees/internally displaced persons (IDPs), and reconciliation (UNDP, UNDG and 
WB 6). This phase is supposed to last for 12 to 36 months. The last phase is the ‘consolidation’ 
phase that focuses on continuation and deepening of reform processes, institution capacity 
building, extension of infrastructure and services, reconciliation, and inclusive policies (UNDP, 
UNDG and WB 6). This period typically lasts for the first decade after the end of conflict.   
 To summarize, post-conflict settings are complex but they do share a number of common 
characteristics. These characteristics can be described in terms of phases and transitions that 
provide the framework within which post-conflict reconstruction occurs.  
b. Post-Conflict Reconstruction   
 
Post-conflict reconstruction refers to the processes that characterize the various 
transitions in the post-conflict setting described in the previous section. According to Wolff, the 
primary goals of post-conflict reconstruction6 are “building acceptable, accountable, and 
                                                        
6
 Throughout this paper, the term ‘reconstruction’ will be used although the term has been criticized because it 
suggests “a return to the status quo ante” (Barakat and Zyck 1072). The use of the term ‘reconstruction’ in this paper 
should not be taken to imply such a return. Instead, ‘reconstruction’ should suggest the constructing, building, and 
developing of institutions in the new post-conflict setting. 
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transparent institutions, to generate self-sustaining economic growth, and to create a civil society 
with free and independent media, civil organizations, and a general climate in which people once 
again begin to trust each other, and are reconciled with their troubled past and willing to live 
together peacefully” (Wolff 157). More broadly, security must be safeguarded, the duration and 
long-term commitment of international support must be considered and the capacity of the state 
to carry out reforms must be proved. While international intervention may be necessary in the 
short-term, particularly if the international community brokered the peace agreement, plans for 
local ownership of the process should be encouraged at all times and local capacity should be 
developed slowly over the course of the process. Otherwise the international community is 
looking at indefinite involvement in the country or, if they withdraw, there is the danger of a 
return to violence.  
The main goal for reconstruction is to combine the satisfaction of short-term needs with 
plans for long-term development, especially the development of local capacity. While stabilizing 
institutions is key, how this is accomplished lays the groundwork for the long-term efforts to 
ultimately rebuild the society. The key to post-conflict reconstruction lies both in the relationship 
between the international community and the actors involved in the conflict, and, in this 
connection, between short-term and long-term goals. In particular, the international community 
must not take control of reconstruction in such a way as to inhibit the development of local 
capacity. Furthermore, short-term goals, often decided and carried out by international actors, 
need to have long-term goals in mind. The risk of unsuccessful reconstruction is the parties’ 
relapse into conflict; over half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses (Collier, Hoefler, 
and Soderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks” 462). This is likely to occur when consideration has not 
been given to the long-term prospects for the country’s development.  
i. What needs to be rebuilt 
Conflicts typically either destroy or, at least affect all components to a society. So, in a 
sense everything needs to be rebuilt. As noted earlier, the rebuilding process occurs in transitions 
and phases. Del Castillo has defined four key ‘transition’ categories in post-conflict 
reconstruction that relate to the transition periods that define post-conflict settings as reviewed 
above. These are: security, political, social and economic (16-20). While these transitions are 
discussed sequentially, it should be emphasized that they are mutually dependent.  
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The security transition has two components: ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ 
(Krause and Jutersonke 457). The first component addresses the satisfaction of basic human 
needs in economic, health, food, social, and environmental terms. The second component 
concerns the removal of the use or threat of violence from daily life. Wolff expands this category 
to include removing the potential for violence to re-emerge (175). Programs that address the 
issue of security can also involve socioeconomic activities such as emergency humanitarian 
assistance, demobilizing combatants, unification of armed forces, training civilian police forces, 
monitoring and promoting human rights, overseeing judicial reforms, electoral assistance and 
monitoring, and removal of unexploded ordinance (del Castillo 16-18).  
Emphasis should be given to the security transition since several other components to the 
reconstruction process depend on this transition. Lack of physical security impacts donor 
behavior and foreign direct investment both of which have implications for economic 
development (Brown, Langer and Stewart 22). As Krause and Jutersonke note, ensuring basic 
security is also a precursor to political and social development (455). 
 The second transition is political. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, some form 
of temporary or emergency government must be created. Such a government must be guided by a 
temporary constitution whose form is defined by the peace agreement. However, there is a 
danger that the inclusion of a constitution in the peace agreement will lead to it becoming 
permanent. The danger is especially problematic if it makes concessions due to the post-conflict 
setting. Therefore, it is proposed that a temporary constitution be included in the peace 
agreement but that the peace agreement also includes a specific timeline for the development of a 
new constitution. The political transition also encourages new national authorities to emerge to 
develop inclusive political representation characterized by multiparty systems secured by a 
strong rule of law. As stated by Krause and Jutersonke, this often requires redefining political 
competition (449). Political institutions often must transform from an exclusive system to an 
inclusive, non-elitist system. This transition also requires that these new authorities begin the 
long-term goal of institution building. This means (re) building of civil society institutions; that 
is, “voluntary civic associations that operate between the state and the family” (Davies 232). In 
order for governments to secure legitimacy, local support often represented by civil society 
institutions, must be secured. It is important to note that the political transition can affect security. 
If the population believes in the legitimacy of its government then conflict is less likely to break 
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out. The political transition is also important for creating conditions for economic and social 
development, that is, it impacts other transitions (Krause and Jutersonke 448).  
 The third transition is societal. Here, warring parties are encouraged to reconcile in an 
effort to break down the cleavages that may have fueled the conflict in the first place. Formal or 
informal reconciliation processes may occur here. Projects within this transition can also include 
assisting in the creation of organizations characteristic of a civil society and appointing a national 
ombudsperson to address human rights grievances. The societal transition can be very personal. 
Many people have to deal with psychological or physical trauma. Thus, this process can involve 
therapy and rehabilitation. If reconciliation occurs, this will strengthen security. It will also affect 
political stability and economic prosperity.   
The last transition has economic prosperity as its goal. During the entire reconstruction 
process, economic development must be emphasized. Post-conflict economic reconstruction 
“includes not only rehabilitation of basic services and rebuilding of physical and human 
infrastructure but also the stabilization and structural reform policies as well as the 
microeconomic foundations required to create a market economy and reactivate investment and 
broad-based economic growth” (del Castillo 29). On a more basic level, if individuals feel that 
times of conflict are economically beneficial, then there is no incentive for them to become 
active participants in the reconstruction process. Additionally, if unemployment and poverty are 
high, it is less likely that the rebuilding of institutions will be successful. Low economic 
development also affects the probability of return of IDPs and refugees that is itself important for 
economic development. Employment programs give people a sense of local ownership in the 
reconstruction process. However, it is important that these programs and vocational training are 
in line with the demands of the labor market.  
 Given the typology described above, it is clear that reconstruction should be attempted 
consequentially. Sarason and Kelly argue that “strategic interventions or planned change in any 
one part of a system affect all parts in reverberating pathways” (qtd in Weinstein and Stover 18). 
If considered consequentially, it is easier to combine both the short-term and long-term goals of 
reconstruction. While stabilization is necessary for long-term development to proceed, there is a 
reciprocal relationship between the two, such that long-term development can strengthen 
stabilization. The chance that long-term development will be addressed is significantly increased 
if long-term provisions are given a place in the short-term. If any transitions are absent from, or 
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incorrectly applied to, the process of reconstruction, there is the risk that the other transitions will 
not be successful. In particular there is the risk that there will be low economic development, 
high unemployment, potential for relapse into conflict, generational ethnic division, lack of 
reconciliation, and weak political institutions, all of which hinder successful reconstruction. If 
post-conflict societies want to move beyond these problems, then all transitions must be 
considered and the potential impact of each on the others must be acknowledged. Also, the short-
term and long-term goals to reconstruction must be considered when action is taken to 
implement the transitions. This means that consideration of the future impact of short-term goals 
on long-term development must be taken into account. 
To summarize, post-conflict reconstruction encompasses a wide variety of activities: 
“infrastructure, rehabilitation, governance, economic development, demilitarization, security 
sector reform, public administration reform, refugee resettlement, peace building, women’s 
empowerment, health, education and many others” (Barakat and Zyck 1071).  The roles of 
reconciliation and education, as key components to the reconstruction process, will be considered 
later in the paper.  
ii. Who is in charge of rebuilding? 
The actors in charge of rebuilding are largely determined by the peace agreement. As 
Wolff argues, the success of post-conflict reconstruction depends on the ‘suitability’ of the 
agreement and its relation to a larger planning framework for the development of sustainable 
peace (175). This means allocating responsibilities to all parties involved in reconstruction 
efforts. Once a peace agreement has been signed, the international community participates 
accordingly. The way in which reconstruction will evolve depends on whether a mandate is 
given to international organizations such as the UN or to local actors (del Castillo 12). According 
to del Castillo, outside institutions should not lead reconstruction efforts if peace is meant to be 
long lasting. The UN typically has the mandate and impartiality to integrate “the many political, 
humanitarian, military and socioeconomic activities” (del Castillo 45). Nonetheless, peace and 
growth are ultimately dependent on post-conflict societies themselves (Elbadawi 5). This is why 
a strong civil society is necessary for successful reconstruction. Once civil society develops there 
can be more local agency to support reconstruction efforts, including institution building.  
One of the most important components to the reconstruction process is the coordination 
between international and local actors. There also needs to be coordination among the 
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international agencies working in the region. These typically include the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Development Program (UNDP), the 
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), the UN Department of Political Affairs 
(UNDPA), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC), to name a few. The largest dilemma faced by the international 
community when intervening in the aftermath of war is deciding their long-term projection and 
the desired level of community involvement. While the international community would be more 
successful in the short-term if they brought in outside expertise and conducted the necessary 
reforms on their own, this would jeopardize the long-term success of the reconstruction process 
(Wolff 162). This implies that the long-term success of the reconstruction process is dependent 
on the development of local capacity rather than international involvement.   
As Barakat and Zyck have argued, there has been ‘mission creep’ in the field of post-
conflict reconstruction (1071); that is, different agencies have become increasingly involved in 
activities that were not specified by their original mandate. This makes coordination among 
agencies even more challenging. In part this ‘mission creep’ can be seen as a response to 
‘conflict creep’. The changing nature of conflicts, particularly in the past twenty years, has led to 
changes to the way organizations address post-conflict reconstruction. 
International involvement can also include financial aid. Post-conflict societies must rely 
on bilateral and multilateral support in the form of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction 
aid. Humanitarian assistance provides the minimum necessary to alleviate the humanitarian 
disaster, whereas reconstruction aid helps with the “rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and 
services to improve security and law enforcement, as well as to implement other measures aimed 
at strengthening the country’s institutional framework” (del Castillo 81). While humanitarian aid 
tends to flow due in part to the ‘CNN Effect’, it takes more effort to secure funding for the long-
term reconstruction process even though reconstruction aid is less costly than humanitarian 
assistance. Such funding depends on the presence of a secure environment because donors are 
typically risk averse. Furthermore, to move beyond ‘permanent crises management’, capacity 
building must be emphasized to prevent aid dependency (Wolff 156). 
 The question becomes how is reconstruction aid distributed amongst the transitions in the 
reconstruction process. Many post-conflict societies are able to tap into a ‘peace dividend,’ the 
money that was being spent on military expenditures, which can now be used for other purposes 
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(del Castillo 79). This fund is less plentiful in cases where the conflict was fueled from outside. 
What is funded and who supplies the funds is dependent upon the post-conflict setting.  
c. The situation in BiH 
  
This section describes the post-conflict reconstruction process in BiH. As reviewed above, 
reconstruction occurs in phases and transitions. BiH exhibited many of the characteristics of a 
‘typical’ post-conflict setting. However, BiH’s reconstruction efforts, led by the international 
community7, show a lack of planning for the long-term and low local capacity development.  
 Interestingly, international funding has been plentiful in the case of BiH. During the 
reconstruction process, BiH has received more than 5 billion in assistance (Tzifakis and 
Tsardanidis 78). This was divided into two phases of support: the first was from 1996-1999 for 
“reconstruction programmes aimed primarily at rehabilitation of infrastructure and restoration of 
public services and the establishment of a viable macroeconomic framework”; the second was 
from 2000 to the present to support reform efforts in the economic, political and judicial sectors 
(Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 70). The World Bank8 started reconstruction efforts in 1996. A total of 
sixteen ‘emergency projects’ were created to address the reconstruction of key sectors (A. 
Kreimer, J. Eriksson, R. Muscat, M. Arnold, C. Scott 11). Despite the large amount of 
international support, economic recovery has not occurred. As international aid continues to 
decrease, it has become apparent that BiH is dependent on aid. As aid went up until 1999 and 
then subsequently down, GDP growth rates have dropped steadily from 1996 onwards.  
As stated earlier, peace agreements must address both short-term and long-term goals of 
the reconstruction process. Additionally, the connection between the international community 
                                                        
7
 Here, the author refers to those actors involved in BiH, including those active in the Peace Implementation 
Council: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China (resigned in May 2000), 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States of America; 
the High Representative, the Brcko Arbitration Panel (dissolved in 1999 after the Final Award was issued), the 
Council of Europe, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Commission, 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Transitional Administration of 
Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES; disbanded in January 1998) and the World Bank. 
8
 The World Bank played a key role in peace negotiations, mobilizing of resources, jointly preparing assessments 
and strategies, sectoral and in country coordination.  
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and local actors is key to promote a successful reconstruction process. Wolff claims that the less 
local capacity is developed the less likely reconstruction will be successful (162). Local capacity 
here refers to the ability of the local population to carry out the normal functions of a society. In 
the case of BiH, the way in which the international community coordinated efforts did little to 
increase local ownership of the process and did not consider what would be needed for long-term 
reconstruction.  
i. The Dayton Peace Accords 
The reconstruction process begins with the signing of a peace agreement. Efforts towards 
establishing peace in BiH began as early as 1992. The first proposal, created by the international 
community to end the fighting, was the Vance Owen Plan of 1993. This plan aimed to create a 
number of cantons, ultimately decentralizing the state. The goal was to reduce the risk of future 
partition by preventing ethnic territories from forming. In reality, “the boundaries of these 
cantons were devised to create an ethnic majority (or at least significant plurality) in each based 
on mapping the 1991 census figures” (Aitken 254). The idea of a decentralized state was the 
foundation of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA)9, signed in 1995. The DPA divided the country 
into two entities along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line10 thus creating the Republika Srpska (RS), 
which is 49% of the state, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), 51%, which was 
further divided into ten cantons. Interestingly, even though the conflict was considered to be an 
ethnic civil war, the international community brought Croatia and Serbia into the peace 
agreement rather than Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. This meant that two of the warring 
parties were not involved in the peace agreement.  
Despite the fact that the initiatives contained in the DPA were at least partially consistent 
with the reconstruction typology, the ways in which these reconstruction transitions were 
implemented have led to failed reconstruction. The DPA set up a constitution that has led to a 
paralyzed government, one that is characterized by an ‘ethnocracy’ rather than a ‘democracy’ 
(Zagar 64). Overall, BiH has remained under the control of the international community. This  
                                                        
9
 The Dayton Peace Accords has ten annexes: Annex I-A Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement; 
Annex I-B Agreement on Regional Stabilization; Annex II Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related 
Issues; Annex III Agreement on Elections; Annex IV Constitution; Annex V Agreement on Arbitration; Annex VI 
Agreement on Human Rights; Annex VII Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons; Annex VIII Agreement 
on the Commission to Preserve National Monuments; Annex IX Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina Public 
Corporations; Annex X Agreement on Civilian Implementation; and Annex XI Agreement on International Police 
Task Force. The DPA can be accessed at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379. 
10
 See Annex II. 
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has done little to improve local ownership and capacity. Additionally, the DPA failed to address 
the need for a long-term development plan.  
a. The Constitution (Annex IV) and the role of the OHR (Annex X) 
The DPA created the working constitution for BiH.11 The constitution defines Bosniacs12, 
Croats and Serbs as the constituent peoples and refers to all other categories of people as 
‘Others’. The overarching theme of the constitution was to allocate more power to the entities 
than to the State13 of BiH; in other words, decentralizing the state while strengthening the entities. 
There are in fact three levels of government: state level, entity level and cantonal level. Entities 
have the right to “establish parallel relationships with neighboring states” and can “enter into 
agreements with states and international organizations with the consent of the Parliamentary 
Assembly.” The constitution continues by stating, “all governmental functions and powers not 
expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be 
those of the Entities.” To summarize, little power was given to the national level of government.   
The parliamentary assembly is composed of the House of Peoples14 and the House of 
Representatives15. Article III states “a proposed decision of the Parliamentary Assembly may be 
declared to be destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb people by a majority of, 
as appropriate, the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb Delegates.” Vital interests are loosely defined and can 
easily be used for a nationalistic agenda. Only the constituent peoples can run for office. 
The presidency is comprised of three rotating members: one Bosniac and one Bosnian 
Croat, from the FBiH, and one Bosnian Serb from the RS. Annex IV Article V states “a 
dissenting Member of the Presidency may declare a Presidency Decision to be destructive of 
vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected.” Again, the way in 
which vital interest is defined has allowed leaders to veto initiatives that they claim threaten their 
ethnic group. 
                                                        
11
 See Annex IV. 
12
 This term refers to Bosnian Muslims. 
13
 These include: a. Foreign policy, b. Foreign trade policy, c. Customs policy, d. Monetary policy as provided in 
Article VII, e. Finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, f. 
Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation, g. International and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, 
including relations with Interpol, h. Establishment and operation of common and international communications 
facilities, i. Regulation of inter-Entity transportation, and j. Air traffic control. Please see 
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372. 
14
 Comprised of 15 delegates, two thirds elected from the Federation and one third from the Republika Srpska.  
15
 Comprised of 42 members, two thirds elected from the Federation and one third from the Republika Srpska.  
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A unique institution, created under the DPA, is the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR). The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which is comprised of 
55 countries and international organizations, is responsible for nominating the High 
Representative.16 The nomination is then sent to the UN Security Council for endorsement. OHR 
was appointed to “facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, 
coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the 
peace settlement.”17 Annex X Article V states that “the High Representative is the final authority 
in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace 
settlement.” In 1997, the High Representative’s powers were expanded at the PIC Conference in 
Bonn. It was decided that the High Representative be able “to remove from office public officials 
who violate legal commitments… and to impose laws as he sees fit.”18 In effect, the peace 
agreement gave the international community the responsibility of rebuilding and creating a 
foundational constitution for a functional state through this institution.  
i. Problems with the constitution and the OHR 
This section discusses the problems that arise when a constitution is incorporated into a 
peace agreement without a specific plan for its overhaul once the country has stabilized. The way 
in which the international community defined the conflict is discussed as it affected the way in 
which the government subsequently functioned. Then, the components to the constitution are 
analyzed. Finally, the role of OHR in the DPA is discussed.   
In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, some sort of temporary or emergency 
government was needed. This government was guided by the constitution incorporated in the 
DPA. The constitution, which was meant to be a temporary fix to get BiH past the initial trauma 
of the war, is still the working constitution today. While peace agreements should aim to address 
both short-term and long-term goals, the DPA addressed only short-term needs. Since 
constitutions have long-term implications, the DPA failed because it did not incorporate a 
provision, which stated a time when BiH must reconsider the constitution. As a result, the 
country has become gridlocked.   
The origin of the gridlock can be traced to the fact that the international community 
characterized the conflict as an ethnic civil war. In general, ethnic conflicts increase the political 
                                                        
16
 Please see http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/. 
17
 Please see http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=366. 
18
 Please see http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/. 
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salience of ethnicity (Simonsen 299). Defining the conflict as such “meant that people came to 
accept the logic that their own security depended on solidarity with the national group and 
members of other groups posed a security threat” (Aitken 251). Thus, the DPA institutionalized 
ethnic wartime divisions (Torsti, “Segregated Education” 67). In so doing, they accommodated 
ethnic nationalism into their structure and “recognized the territorial gains of war and ethnic 
cleansing” (Zagar 63). This has had profound long-term effects for the political system: 
“institutionalizing ethnicity in a constitutional settlement freezes ethnic divisions at the moment 
of greatest tension and limits the possibilities of a later decline in the salience of ethnicity” 
(Aitken 260). This has allowed and almost encouraged parties and candidates to pursue agendas 
that are in line with their ethnicity, which, in turn, has led voters to vote according to their 
ethnicity (Simonsen 300). According to Horowitz, “‘the electoral system is by far the most 
powerful lever of constitutional engineering for accommodation and harmony in severely 
divided societies’” (qtd. in Reilly 127). In the case of BiH, the electoral system has not 
encouraged harmony but rather has promoted gridlock.  
Overall the DPA were more of a “truce than a true peace treaty” (Zagar 63). The ultimate 
goal of the drafters of document was to stop the war. They ended the ethnic cleansing and 
violence, “responded to the ethnonationalist aspirations of the peoples of BiH, and avoided the 
secession of parts of the country” (Aitken 255).  However, the document did not consider the 
problems that would arise from the constitution they implemented, and the institution of OHR, 
should they be used for the long-term.  
OHR has negatively impacted the development of local capacity and more generally the 
sovereignty of BiH. With its ‘quasi-dictatorial powers’ or ‘protectorate like authority’ OHR has 
been able to intervene to depose political leaders and enforce decision-making. Lord Paddy 
Ashdown, the High Representative who took power in 2002 said “he planned to use the Bonn 
Powers to remove deadlocks and get Bosnia on track to normalization” (Chivvis and Dogo 104). 
During his term, he deposed 60 members of the RS as OHR took on a more coercive role. 
However, while OHR has been successful in deposing officials and in intervening in decision-
making, it has not been active in changing the nature of the political process that would result 
from constitutional reform.  
OHR’s influence has varied according to the individual who holds the office of the High 
Representative. Whereas Ashdown believed in using the Bonn powers, Schwarz-Schilling did 
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not. In 2005, an initiative was put forward to promote constitutional reform. The international 
community, recognizing the limitations of the DPA and the problems stemming from its 
structure, pushed local actors to reform the constitution. While many were in support of the 
initiative, two parliamentarians pulled out at the last minute. This was the beginning of a 
renewed deterioration of Bosnian politics. In 2006, Bosniac leader, Haris Silajdzic wanted to 
have a “one man-one vote system” which would significantly reduce the power of the Bosnian 
Serbs who are in the minority (Chivvis and Dogo 106). This provoked Milorad Dodik, President 
of the RS, to defend the autonomy and power of the RS. Essentially, it became a competition to 
protect one’s own power. Interestingly, both politicians were elected in 2006 on these platforms. 
This was made possible largely because of the new High Representative, Christian Schwarz-
Schilling, failed to intervene, believing that OHR should not use its Bonn Powers to intervene 
because they prevent democracy from growing in BiH (Chivvis and Dogo 106). It is important to 
note that President Dodik is known for discrediting the institution of the OHR. 
OHR’s original mandate was one year, however it is still active (Torsti, “Segregated 
Education” 66). While the country is stable and secure, it would seem that the local capacity has 
not been built enough to continue the reconstruction process should the international community 
pull out. In fact, Zagar stated that “the involvement of the international community, particularly 
the Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative remains important, 
sometimes essential” (67).  
In summary, the DPA in effect prohibited BiH from becoming sovereign. By 
institutionalizing ethnicity, it created no incentive for politicians to reform the constitution that is 
necessary for BiH to move forward.  Additionally, the Bosnian population is “loudly denounced 
as dysfunctional for failing to embrace internationally imposed constitutional arrangements” 
under the DPA (Hughes and Pupavac 881). However, it is not clear how the local population 
could achieve this given the role of the international community. A peace agreement was signed 
and it did include a post-conflict constitution. However, by including a constitution in the peace 
agreement without also determining a fixed end date or process for constitutional reform, the 
DPA have prevented BiH from moving forward. Additionally, the actions of OHR, and the fact 
that the constitution was drawn up by international actors, have not encouraged local capacity 
development or local ownership of the process.  
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b. Other aspects of the DPA 
The DPA also contains annexes and provisions that lay the groundwork for other 
reconstruction efforts. These include agreements on the military, regional stabilization, election 
procedures, arbitration, human rights, refugees and displaced persons, commission to preserve 
national monuments, BiH public corporations, civilian implementation, and an international 
police task force (IPTF).19  
i. Security Issues 
Annex I-A states that the international community agrees to send a force, “for a period of 
approximately one year” to assist with the implementation “of the territorial and other militarily 
related provisions of the agreement.” This was the Implementation Force (IFOR) comprised of 
NATO and non-NATO nations whose mission was to “establish a durable cessation of hostilities.” 
This provision aimed to reduce the risk of violence reoccurring by ensuring security. IFOR was 
also allotted the power to assist with elections, humanitarian missions, movement of civilian 
populations, refugees and displaced persons, and to monitor landmine removal. Annex I-A also 
describes what is encompassed in the Early Recovery and Stabilization/Transition Phase, that is, 
establishing security, meeting humanitarian needs, and strengthening post-crisis governance, 
which in this case was accomplished by international forces. 
There is still an international force present in BiH today because of the lack of 
reconciliation. After the ‘successful’ elections in 1996, IFOR had completed its mission of 
implementing the Military Annexes of the DPA.  However, it was clear that the post-conflict 
environment still posed a threat to peace. It was decided that a reduced force was still needed to 
provide “the stability necessary for consolidating the peace” (SFOR). NATO subsequently 
organized a Stabilization Force (SFOR), which took the place of IFOR. In 2004, SFOR’s mission 
ended and once again the international community did not feel that BiH was prepared for 
complete removal of international forces. The European Union launched EU Force (EUFOR), a 
force of 7,000, and assumed responsibility for peacekeeping operations (NATO). This shows 
little local capacity development and trust.  
The Annex also prohibited the firing of weapons and explosive devices by the warring 
parties. All foreign troops, Croatian or Serbian or those from other neighboring states, were 
required to leave thirty days after the signing of the peace agreement. The Joint Military 
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 Please see http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379. 
 25
Commission addressed land mine removal, another component to del Castillo’s security 
transition. Each warring party was required to turn over maps indicating where “unexploded 
ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements” etc. had 
been laid. Ensuring basic security as mentioned earlier is a precursor to the success of other 
reform efforts. 
Landmines in cities and their surrounding areas have largely been removed. However, 
there is no guarantee of the location of the mines since the warring parties often did not make 
maps and nature can shift the locations of mines over the years. Additionally, land mine removal 
is expensive. According to the BH Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 2.9% of BiH is still mine-
infested with some 22,000 mines and unexploded ordinance suggesting that a form of physical 
insecurity is still present (BHMAC). Between 2003-2006, there were approximately 3 victims 
per month, killed by landmines (Council of Ministers). Mine education programs led by 
BHMAC and other NGOs have been implemented. However, large areas of BiH still remain 
inaccessible due to landmines, and children and farmers still find unexploded ordinance by the 
roads.   
Annex I-B continues the security transition by describing a DDR program. Severe 
restrictions were placed on arms movement and on ownership of arms. Annex I-A described 
prisoner exchange procedures, which could be seen as a form of reintegration. Additionally, 
“each party shall comply with any order or request of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia for the arrest, detention, surrender of or access to persons who would otherwise be 
released and transferred.” The ICTY and its impact on the reconstruction process will be 
discussed later.  
Lastly, Annex IX states that the parties agreed to an international police force. This 
included civilian law enforcement overseen by the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF). 
The IPTF did develop local capacity by advising and training local personnel on law 
enforcement. This suggests judicial and security institution building that occurs in the 
transformation/institution building phase of the UNDP, UNDG, and WB plan for reconstruction.  
ii. Elections 
Annex III deals more with the political transition and aims to create an inclusive, non-
elitist multi party system in addition to rebuilding civil society. The Annex describes conditions 
for democratic elections: “a politically neutral environment; shall protect and enforce the right to 
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vote in secret without fear or intimidation; shall ensure freedom of expression and of the press; 
shall allow and encourage freedom of association; and shall ensure freedom of movement.” This 
implies the development of acceptable, accountable and transparent institutions that is in line 
with Wolff’s concept of the ideal post-conflict reconstruction process. Additionally, fair 
elections empower civil society by allowing civilians to hold their government accountable. 
OSCE was the international overseer of the election process. However, according to a personal 
contact, there is no civil society in BiH.20 While it is hard to determine the reason for this, there 
is little confidence in BiH’s political process.  
The timing of the first BiH election compromised the potential benefits of the political 
transition. If held too early “elections in fragile situations can easily undermine the long-term 
challenge of building a sustainable democracy” which is what happened in BiH (Reilly 121). 
Additionally, the early elections allowed politicians to succeed by using the ‘ethnic card’, which 
has had lasting impacts on inter-ethnic communication (Reilly 132). Many wartime leaders, 
sometimes even war criminals, were able to continue to hold power. Political parties became 
extensions and variants of wartime armies. According to Reilly, “this generals-to-politicians 
transformation has been a recurring problem in the Balkans, where nationalist parties and elites 
have attempted to use the political process to continue to press their sectarian aims” (Reilly 121). 
Holding early elections can also be seen as a quick fix solution to reconstruction, as they develop 
a façade for a democratic system allowing the international community an exit strategy.  
iii. Other Institutions  
Article VI, elaborated in Annex V, states that parties agreed to the establishment of an 
arbitration tribunal, a Commission on Human Rights, a Commission on Refugees and Displaced 
Persons, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments, and Bosnia and Herzegovina Public 
Corporations.” To a certain extent, this suggests a willingness to collaborate between the parties 
and clearly defined actors responsible for these parts of the reconstruction process. 
In Annex VI, parties agreed to the rights and freedoms as defined in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In addition to 
adhering to these principles, a commission on Human Rights was established which contained 
the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson and the Human Rights Chamber. The 
responsibilities of these institutions are to consider violations of human rights and the grievances 
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 Interview with BiH Government Official conducted on 7/16/10.  
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of victims. This transition also includes the breaking down of cleavages that are a precursor to 
reconciliation. However, these institutions did not incorporate this into their mandate, although 
parties were encouraged to support human rights. Within the first few years, these institutions 
were flooded with grievances.  
Annex VII expands on human rights protections for refugees and displaced persons. This 
falls under the stabilization/transition and the transformation/institution building phases. These 
persons have the right to return to their place of origin. This means they have the right to have 
their property returned to them or be compensated should this not be possible. Those who decide 
to return are also protected under the Annex from “harassment, intimidation, persecution, or 
discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief or political opinion.” 
The Annex also allows families to choose their location for return and states that repatriation 
cannot be forced. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with contributions from the 
ICRC and UNDP, was appointed as the overseer of this process. A Commission for Displaced 
Persons and Refugees was also created. The purpose of the Commission is to “receive and decide 
any claims for real property… where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise 
transferred since April 1, 1992.” This was an effort to return property to pre-war owners and to 
settle disputes.   
 During the war an estimated 2.2 million people were displaced. 1.2 million were refugees 
and one million were IDPs. It is important to note that displacement was not a by-product of the 
war, but rather its very goal (Haider, “Humanitarian Assistance” 2). The population shifts were 
tremendous; 90% of the pre-war Bosnian Serb population left what is now the FBiH and 95% of 
the pre-war Bosnian Croat and Bosniac population left what is now the RS. UNHCR supports 
three durable solutions for displaced persons: voluntary repatriation, local integration, or 
resettlement to a third country. In the case of BiH, return was seen as the best option for a 
number of reasons. First, the large number of refugees posed a burden for the international 
community. Few countries were prepared to have thousands of refugees resettle in their country. 
Second, return was seen as a “central component of peace building – a way to restore pre-war 
‘normalcy’” (Haider, “Humanitarian Assistance” 2). International agencies believed that return 
was also the best way to promote reconciliation in the long run as it would reverse ethnic 
cleansing by promoting return to pre-war locations, or a return to status ante quo. In 1999, there 
was a shift away from the right to return towards the right to reclaim property. The Property Law 
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Implementation Plan (PLIP) encouraged people to submit a claim for their property. While there 
was no direct compensation, the international community supplied funds for houses to be rebuilt. 
The statistics from this plan suggest that many returned home to claim their property. However, 
the reality is that little was done to monitor who sold their property after reconstruction and then 
moved to another location. Therefore, these statistics do not necessarily accurately reflect who 
returned.  
To date, 1,026,786 former refugees and IDPs have returned to their pre-war locations 
including, 467,388 minority returnees (UNHCR, “Statistics Package”). There are still 70,018 
refugees and 113,642 IDPs (UNHCR, “UNHCR: Bosnia-Herzegovina”). UNHCR encourages 
sustainable return. However, in the case of BiH this seems to have been neglected. Many 
Bosnians longed to return home. But when they returned, the memory of home did not match the 
reality on the ground; “…old neighbors had disappeared. Tensions, deep resentments and 
residual fear within reshaped communities were widespread. Employment and income-
generating opportunities were sparse, discrimination against minority returnees prevalent and 
poverty rampant” (Haider, “Humanitarian Assistance” 4). The protection of minority returnees 
presented a serious challenge to UNHCR and OHR. Many did not feel comfortable returning to 
their pre-war locations for fear of being attacked or for fear of assimilation. This is one reason 
for the initiative for segregated schools, to be explored later in this paper. However, this 
segregation within the communities has prevented interaction among different ethnic groups. The 
truth is that there are some areas where “no matter what happens, it’s going to be 100 % of one 
ethnic group because of the impact of ethnic cleansing.”21 
Local integration in countries where refugees sought sanctuary was never considered to 
be an option. The international community treated it as a taboo that would jeopardize their efforts 
at reversing ethnic cleansing. They feared “that it would indirectly support and cement ethnic 
cleansing” (Haider, “Humanitarian Assistance” 7).  
While refugee and IDP return is important to post-conflict reconstruction, the 
international community created a system that cemented ethnic divisions. By supporting the 
alternative, refugee return, without providing programs for community reconciliation, ethnic 
separation was essentially cemented. One program that showed promise was the ‘Imagine 
Coexistence’ initiative. The idea was that promoting coexistence would eventually lead to 
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 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 2/3/11. Quoted with permission. 
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reconciliation. However the project was not widespread throughout BiH and only lasted 18 
months. Additionally, Haider argued that coexistence alone cannot foster reconciliation and 
tolerance (Haider, “(Re)Imagining Coexistence” 93). The absence of reconciliation led to 
separation between the minority returnees and the ethnic majority as minority groups isolated 
themselves from the community out of fear.  
Infrastructure development was cited as a key component to reconstruction. This 
typically occurs in the stabilization/transition and transformation/institution building phases. 
Annex IX states, “bearing in mind that reconstruction of the infrastructure and the functioning of 
transportation and other facilities are important for the economic resurgence of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and for the smooth functioning of its institutions and the organizations involved in 
implementation of the peace agreement.” A Commission on Public Corporations was established 
to operate utility, energy, postal and communication institutions. Additionally, a Commission to 
Preserve National Monuments was created. National monuments are property “having cultural, 
historic, religious or ethnic importance.” There have been conflicts over which ethnic groups’ 
monuments should be reconstructed first. This has increased tensions between groups. When a 
mosque is rebuilt, Catholics and Orthodox Christians want their churches to be rebuilt. 
Additionally, in terms of overall rebuilding of destroyed infrastructure, buildings that were 
destroyed are still waiting to be rebuilt. According to a personal contact, “we always believed 
that the other side would pay for the damages.” Despite the state of many buildings, which to an 
outsider may still seem to be in complete ruins, there have been significant developments in 
infrastructure since the end of the war. Water, public transportation, sewage, and other such 
services have been repaired. The outside appearance of several buildings throughout the country 
remains to be fixed. Additionally, many houses have been vacant and left in ruins since the end 
of the war.  
c. Overall Summary  
The DPA did address some of the key components to post-conflict reconstruction. 
According to the characteristics of post-conflict settings laid out by Barkat and Zyck and Brown, 
Langer and Stewart, the DPA touched on infrastructure, governance, demilitarization, 
establishing a functioning state, security reform, public administration reform, refugee 
resettlement, and peace building (Barakat and Zyck 1071) (Brown, Langer and Stewart 5). 
However some of the most important components to reconstruction are completely absent from 
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the DPA. These include programs for economic recovery, civil society development, education, 
reconciliation, and societal integration, all of which require long-term planning. As a result, 
unemployment is around 42% and over 50% of the population lives below the poverty line 
(Haider, “(Re) Imagining Coexistence” 97). Education, a potentially very powerful tool to 
promote successful reconstruction, is only mentioned as a right, even though there were severe 
divisions in education in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. Interestingly, reconciliation 
was only mentioned in Annex I-A: “to establish lasting security and arms control measures as 
outlined in Annex I-B to the General Framework Agreement, which aim to promote a permanent 
reconciliation between all Parties …” However, it seems unlikely that reconciliation here means 
breaking down the cleavages in the population, since the removal of the threat of violence and 
arms is hardly enough to promote reconciliation of an ethnically polarized society.  
Overall, the DPA did not combine short-term and long-term efforts resulting in a poor 
long-term reconstruction plan. Additionally, they did not encourage local ownership and their 
implementers did not increase local capacity with time. A number of things went wrong. First, 
the international forces that were meant to be in BiH for approximately a year remain there to 
this day. There is little incentive for local actors to address the country’s problems when there is 
still someone else there that has the appearance of doing it for them. Second, in almost every 
Annex, there is an international organization appointed as the overseer to the process. While this 
was necessary for successful short-term efforts, the DPA gave no directions for the promotion of 
local capacity. There was also no end date for the involvement of the international community. 
III. Reconciliation  
Reconciliation falls under the broader category of transitional justice, which aims “to 
transform relationships between people in post-conflict settings” (Selimovic 3), relationships that 
have become fractured and conflictual. According to Magill, Smith and Hamber, reconciliation 
typically includes five components: (1) developing a shared vision, (2) acknowledging and 
dealing with the past; (3) building positive relationships; (4) significant cultural and attitudinal 
change, and (5) substantial social, economic and political change (equity and equality) (15-16). 
There are two primary programs/systems used by the international community that try to 
promote reconciliation in post-conflict settings. These are truth and reconciliation commissions 
(TRCs) and ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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Yugoslavia (ICTY). Regardless of which of these is implemented or if a more localized program 
is developed, it is clear that the past must be dealt with as a part of the reconstruction process if it 
aims to be successful (Wolff 185).  
 TRCs and tribunals “promote reconciliation by forcing societies emerging from war or 
periods of political violence to ‘come to terms’ with the past, achieve ‘closure’ and stability” 
(Weinstein and Stover 13). The largest limitation of the courts and TRCs is that they seek to 
determine what trust is and subsequently force it onto the population. The reality is that finding 
truth is an individualized process. Therefore many leaders in the field of truth, justice and 
reconciliation argue for combined approaches that place local victims and perpetrators at the 
center of the process. 
For many individuals, the reconstruction of their lives may continue for generations. 
According to Davies “the consequences of conflict, like shrapnel, penetrate deep into minds and 
hearts, to be worked out over a lifetime and beyond, and affecting relationships and identities for 
generations” (230). This process requires empathy, recognition of shared suffering and 
rehumanization of the ‘other’ (Haider, “(Re) Imagining Coexistence” 99). As Rogan notes, 
rehumanization can be achieved through personal contact as this helps to remove fears (Haider, 
“(Re) Imagining Coexistence” 99). This is what reconciliation must address.  
 Reconciliation presents a particular challenge in post-ethnic conflict settings. As stated by 
Wolff, the majority of the damage caused by ethnic conflicts cannot be repaired through physical 
reconstruction efforts alone (179). The emotional and physical injuries to the civilian population 
can deeply penetrate society leaving long-lasting marks. These injuries “not only serve to 
polarize and radicalize societies during the conflict, but they also often prevent reconciliation 
afterwards and contribute to continued tensions between the (former) conflict parties and their 
supporters, regardless of any deals that leaders may have struck” (Wolff 179).  
a. Reconciliation and Reconstruction  
  
Reconciliation is essential to a sustainable post-conflict reconstruction process, as it 
impacts nearly all transitions especially the development of civil society, local capacity, and 
sense of security, along with refugee and IDP return. As argued earlier, reconstruction is not 
possible without local capacity development. To strengthen local capacity, the international 
community must be able to tap into the resources of a unified civil society. According to 
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Hoogenboom and Vielle, civil society is “a space that exists between the household and the state 
where people develop relationships and interact independently from state institutions” (192).  
However, civil society will remain divided without reconciliation processes. On the other hand, it 
has been argued that reconciliation cannot begin until civil society has developed (Wolff 187). 
Rebuilding a civil society takes time but it is only once it has been developed that ‘real 
reconciliation’ can occur. It seems, therefore, that there is a reciprocal relationship between 
reconstruction and reconciliation. 
In the presence of a weak civil society or one that excludes a group or groups, the 
international community is likely to step in and impose their views of a civil society on the local 
population instead of letting it develop organically. In the first case, if people are unwilling to 
work together to create a unified society, then the international community is unlikely to trust 
local actors and to give them agency in the process. As a result, local capacity will not be 
developed. In the second case, the international community may support a civil society still 
represented solely by parties involved in the conflict. Furthermore, NGOs who support civil 
society development often morph themselves into agencies more concerned with pleasing the 
international community than in meeting the needs of the local population. Overall, if civil 
society is not developed then local capacity is also likely to be missing from reconstruction.  
Reconciliation can impact security issues especially ‘freedom from fear’. This can be fear 
of assimilation (present in post-ethnic conflict settings) or the fear of being physically threatened 
or attacked. Since people will not return to their places of origin if they do not feel secure, 
reconciliation affects refugee and IDP return.  
b. The Situation in BiH 
  
Everyone in BiH has a story to tell about his or her experiences during the war. 
According to Nelson, even though recovery and reconstruction efforts have been taking place, 
the trauma from the war remains central to the lives of all Bosnians (306). Reconciliation must 
take place in a complex context given the scale and magnitude of the conflict. In 2003, the 
Secretary of the War Crimes Commission reported that they had “collected information on over 
31,000 names of war criminals, 220,000 names of victims of war crimes, 75,000 names of people 
who were killed or are missing from the war, 45,000 names of people who were imprisoned 
during the war, 329 mass graves, over 800 villages were totally eradicated, and over 20,000 
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women who were raped as an act of war” (Nelson 307). War broke down all social ties between 
the different ethnic groups.  
 BiH presents an interesting case because there has been arguably only one initiative by 
the international community to promote reconciliation. According to a leading education official, 
“the International Community is very good at bricks and mortar reconstruction but it is bad at 
hearts and minds.”22 This section will look into the ICTY and discuss its successes and failures. 
The second portion of this section will present indicators that show the absence of reconciliation 
within BiH.  
i. The ICTY  
According to Hoogenboom and Vielle, the ICTY has been the main mechanism for 
justice and reconciliation in post-conflict BiH (189). These authors distinguish between a thin 
conception of reconciliation i.e. ending the violence, creating democratic institutions, and 
applying retributive justice (which is what the ICTY implemented) from thick reconciliation i.e. 
building relationships, restorative justice, establishing truth and forgiveness. They argue that “a 
thin conception of reconciliation as imposed on a warring state by the international community 
does not seem to be enough to forge lasting relationships between former enemies and create a 
shared future” (Hoogenboom and Vieille 195). 
In May 1993, the UN Security Council established the ICTY in The Hague (Fletcher and 
Weinstein 29). Those who supported this initiative hoped it would replicate the principles of 
Nuremberg, emphasizing individual responsibility and accountability over community. The 
initial goals of the ICTY were to punish war criminals and restore peace and justice (Fletcher and 
Weinstein 36). However, these goals have expanded since the court was created to include the 
promotion of reconciliation. While this is contested, many have argued that there is a link 
between the justice work of the ICTY and reconciliation. Despite this perceived link, the ICTY 
received no mandate to promote reconciliation (Fletcher and Weinstein 37). While the creation 
of this tribunal was a major step for international criminal law (humanitarian and human rights 
law), its impact on reconciliation at the local level is less obvious. 
 Since the ICTY has struggled to gain legitimacy in BiH, there are serious concerns about 
the connection between the ICTY and the local population. First, the creation of the ICTY 
highlights the tension between the international community and the local population in the post-
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conflict setting. Some claim that the ICTY is a “western European legal tradition” which was 
created out of guilt on the part of the international community for its failure to stop the ethnic 
cleansing (Fletcher and Weinstein 34-35). Weinstein and Stover state “the architects of the 
tribunals placed primary responsibility for the prosecution of war crimes in the hands of 
international authorities that would be free from local influences” (11).  While this separation 
may have been necessary initially because of potential biases on the part of local prosecutors, 
there was no effort to prepare and develop the capacity of the national courts in BiH. Rather, the 
entire BiH legal system was undermined, which has led to resentment on behalf of local 
prosecutors. The local courts have also been backed up with cases (Watch). The ICTY 
established primacy over the domestic court system and there was no formal connection between 
the two judicial systems. As a result, the national court systems have not been able to handle the 
prosecution of war crimes in a joint effort with the ICTY (Fletcher and Weinstein 30).  
One of the key components to successful reconciliation, local ownership, is missing. The 
distance between what was most important to the victims versus what was important to the ICTY 
is underlined by the stress placed by BiH citizens on local judicial proceedings. Some witnesses 
who testified against high profile defendants at the ICTY said that their “‘work as witnesses’ 
would be complete only once they had testified against local war criminals whom they held 
directly responsible for the deaths of family members and neighbors” (Stover 107). The ICTY 
missed the opportunity to become more engaged with the local community by not assisting with 
lower-level criminal cases.  
A second concern is that the court is located in The Hague, a site that is both physically 
and linguistically removed from BiH. During the first few years of the ICTY, there was no 
contact between the tribunal and the local population. The ICTY cared little about the way they 
were regarded in BiH. Recently, the ICTY has made efforts to bridge this gap through outreach 
programs that help citizens understand the role of the court. Despite these efforts, the overall 
view of the court system by Bosnians, is negative and the local population sees the ICTY as a 
“world unto itself” (Fletcher and Weinstein 33). 
Interestingly, the degree to which each ethnic group emphasizes the role of the ICTY 
varies according to ethnicity. Selimovic found that, when responding to the statement “the war 
crimes tribunal in The Hague is a precondition for a just peace and normal relations,” 51.6% of 
Bosniacs agreed with the statement, while only 18.7% of Bosnian Croats and 4.7% of Bosnian 
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Serbs agreed (6). In a study conducted by Fletcher and Weinstein, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian 
Croat participants believed that the ICTY was politically biased and thus not able to provide fair 
trials (33). Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic concurred in their rejection of the ICTY 
as an illegal system: both tried to boycott their cases. Historically, more Bosnian Serbs have been 
prosecuted at the ICTY (ICTY). This has led to a sense of ‘victors’ punishment’, which stems 
from the initial identification by the international community of the Bosniacs as the victims and 
the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats as the perpetrators. The international community at this 
time did not account for the atrocities that were committed by all ethnic groups. Each ethnic 
group has subsequently, and slightly competitively, sought “confirmation of its status as victim” 
from the court (Fletcher and Weinstein 39).  
 For many victims, burying their loved ones is a necessary condition to putting the past 
behind them. According to forensic anthropologists, Doretti and Fondebrider, “‘families have a 
desperate need to recover the remains so that they may properly bury them and close – if only 
partially – the circle of uncertainty’” (qtd. in Stover and Shigekane 85). This takes time and 
funding. In contrast, for the ICTY, it was not necessary to establish the identity of individual 
remains but only to establish that a crime had been committed (Stover and Shigekane 85). For 
example, the Office of the Prosecutor decided in the case of the massacre at Srebrenica that the 
“establishment of the victims’ ethnicity and cause and manner of death would be enough to build 
their case” (Stover and Shigekane 91). Therefore, after these facts were established, the bodies 
were placed into a tunnel in Tuzla and some in tubs in a parking lot. If the general sentiment was 
for the ICTY to incorporate reconciliation (as defined by the local population) into their work, 
these bodies should have been identified. During this time, many Srebrenica survivors continued 
to believe that their loved ones were alive. Additionally, many female survivors of Srebrenica  
fell “into a limbo of ‘ambiguous loss,’ torn between hope and grief” (Stover and Shigekane 95). 
While the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) is now in complete control of 
the exhumation and identification process, the ICTY missed a crucial opportunity to connect 
their work to the local community. This is another source of distance between the ICTY and the 
local population.  
 A final concern about the role of the ICTY in promoting reconciliation involves the 
failure to provide witness protection for those who brave the trip to The Hague. There have been 
accounts of people receiving threats and losing their jobs after testifying at the ICTY. For these 
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witnesses “the act of testifying in an international court required an act of great courage, 
especially as they were well aware that war criminals still walked the streets of their villages and 
towns” (Stover 104). Regardless of the risk, many feel it is their duty to testify on behalf of the 
dead. While the ICTY is only responsible for establishing the truth to the extent that the 
individual can be held responsible for the crimes, the witnesses often want more. For some 
witnesses, they hope that, in return for their testimony, the tribunal might help them find 
meaning in the traumatic events they witnessed; they want to know why the person committed 
the crimes (Stover 106). This question is rarely ever answered for them. There is also a lack of 
appreciation within the court system for the witnesses. Witnesses often leave feeling worse than 
when they entered. It is particularly challenging when the witnesses do not feel that an adequate 
sentence was given to the person against whom they testified.  
The overarching purpose of the ICTY, using criminal justice as a response to crime, is 
not contested amongst Bosnians. In fact “the overwhelming opinion is that those who committed 
war crimes must be brought to justice, and that trials are the most legitimate and credible way to 
do so” (J. N. Clark, “The Limits” 8). It seems that the main problem with the ICTY is that, from 
the start, the institution promised too much. Or rather, those individuals who were involved with 
its creation interpreted its mandate incorrectly. Subsequently, this affected the ICTY's reception 
in BiH where it was perceived initially to be an institution that could provide closure to the 
population as the foundation to reconciliation efforts. Interestingly, “the UN resolutions creating 
the ICTY make no mention of the need to build foundations for social reconstruction23 in the 
former Yugoslavia, including consolidation of a national shared history of the war; the creation 
of domestic legal institutions that promote and respect strict adherence to the protection of 
human rights; and democratic institutions capable of guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms” 
(Fletcher and Weinstein 36). Regardless, individuals believed the ICTY could achieve these 
things.  
Stover states “it is an illusion to suppose that the ICTY, located over a thousand miles 
away from the former Yugoslavia, can forge a common version of the history of the Yugoslav 
conflict that would be accepted by all sides” (116). National reconciliation cannot be based on a 
factual record established by the tribunal that people are ‘unable or unwilling’ to recognize. 
Furthermore, the so-called truths established by the ICTY, have not been universally accepted (J. 
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N. Clark, “The Limits” 14). In conclusion, it is clear that war crimes trials, international law and 
its institutions are not able to address the issue of interpersonal reconciliation (Weinstein and 
Stover 14).  
Respondents who participated in the Stover study stated that more had to be done and 
cited arresting local war criminals, finding the missing, providing jobs and adequate housing, 
repairing factories and public buildings, reintegrating primary and secondary schools – were all 
necessary before reconciliation can take place (Stover 117-118). In particular, local 
reconciliation efforts are needed for the long-term success of reconstruction (J. N. Clark, 
“Missing Persons” 229). As Halpern and Weinstein note, “reconciliation must begin at the level 
of the individual – neighbor to neighbor, then house to house, and finally, community to 
community” (306). Therefore, it seems that, for BiH, grassroots efforts are desperately needed to 
promote reconciliation. 
ii. Key Indicators for the Absence of Reconciliation  
There are several key indicators that testify to the absence of reconciliation in BiH. By 
comparing the components to reconciliation laid out by Magill, Smith and Hamber, to the 
situation in BiH, it is clear that little progress has been made. No shared vision has formed, there 
has been little general acknowledgment of what happened during the war, positive relationships 
have not developed, there have been no significant cultural and attitudinal changes, and there has 
not been substantial social, and economic and political change. Additionally Clark found that 
“there is no reconciliation in BiH…while the country is now relatively peaceful, …what exists is 
negative rather than positive peace” (“The Limits” 14). Clark cited mistrust, little to no contact 
with other ethnic groups and the existence of ‘competing truths and denial’ as evidence for a lack 
of reconciliation.  
It has been challenging for grassroots reconciliation efforts to develop. As Steffanson 
notes, addressing the past remains taboo (qtd. in Haider, “(Re) Imagining Coexistence” 100). 
Many feel that collective silence allows “for relatively unproblematic ethnic co-existence” but 
this means avoiding any communication about the war (Stefansson 70). There is a difficulty on 
the part local actors to overcome the strong pull towards identification according to ethnicity. 
Victims and perpetrators are clearly defined terms. As noted earlier, the identities of ‘victim’ and 
‘perpetrator’ have become tied to ethnic communities, largely as a result of the DPA, which 
institutionalized ethnicity. Each group feels that their ethnic group is the victim and that the other 
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ethnic groups are the perpetrators. The ICTY tried to individualize accountability by prosecuting 
individuals and being careful not to associate mass atrocity with one particular ethnic group. 
However, the victims still identify themselves as part of their ethnic group. When arrests are 
made, a Bosnian Serb war hero can be viewed as a major war criminal by the Bosniac population. 
Because of the association between ‘victimhood’ and ethnic identity, it is challenging for groups 
to accept that their ‘side’ also committed atrocities. Politicians often reinforce this association by 
citing the atrocities that were perpetrated against their ethnic group. 
According to Selimovic, “the collective narratives made more sense and offered more 
security than ‘individual justice’ and ‘shared truth’ of the transitional justice paradigm” (6). 
Therefore, in order to promote reconciliation, terms which have been used to categorize entire 
ethnic groups must be broken down so that the conflict is no longer defined as ‘us vs. them’ but 
rather ‘me vs. him/her’, a kind of conflict that is more easily resolved.   
There is often opposition to reconciliation by religious and political leaders. These 
leaders avoid discussing reconciliation as the lack of reconciliation allows them to continue to 
exert their authority (Stover 117). As mentioned earlier, politicians prey on the fear of local 
populations by using ethnic rhetoric, decreasing the chances for inter-ethnic trust and 
communication, but increasing their power.  
Current President of the RS, Milorad Dodik frequently threatens to hold a referendum on 
the independence of Republika Srpska, an action that appears to be designed to weaken the 
power of moderates in all ethnic groups (Chivvis and Dogo 107). There are few incentives for 
President Dodik to change his platform since statements like this make him popular in the RS. 
Additionally, the RS has had significant economic growth, disproportionately relative to the 
FBiH and overall the government in Banja Luka24 functions well. For this reason, it is not in the 
interest of nationalists to change their position since this would undermine their power (Chivvis 
and Dogo 110). By contrast, those who do take a moderate stance, while often praised by the 
international community, receive little support within BiH.  
One of President Dodik’s opponents, Haris Silajdzic has continued to press for a unified 
Bosnian state in which more power would be allocated to the Bosniacs because of their status as 
the majority and the RS would be dismantled as an entity. According to Chivvis and Dogo, 
Bosniacs view “the existence of the Serb republic … as a reward for Serb genocide” (108). 
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While the ultimate goal of many Bosniac politicians may be unification, it is hard for them to see 
the disproportionate power given to the Bosnian Serb minority and Bosnian Serbs, particularly, 
President Dodik will continue to see this goal as a threat to their power in BiH.  
The veto power of the presidency and parliament has been used frequently and OHR has 
had to use their Bonn Powers over the past 15 years. The government has passed only 22 laws in 
the past two years. There have been 260 motions, all of which have been blocked (Cain). 
According to Silajdzic, “with only a 22% vote in the state parliament, you can block 
anything…if you don’t have the high representative with all these vetoes, how can you do 
anything at all?” (Cain).  
 The lack of reconciliation and the paralysis of the parliamentary system are both 
demonstrated by the problems encountered when deciding on the lyrics to a national anthem. It 
was not until February 2009 that the commission for selecting the lyrics of the national anthem 
presented the winning entry (Kovac). However, the lyrics are still awaiting ratification by the 
BiH Council of Ministers. 
Politics is just one area where there is a lack of compromise and dialogue amongst 
persons of different ethnic groups. However, politicians have negatively affected compromise 
and dialogue at a more localized level. Everyday life exhibits few signs of reconciliation. 
Intermarriage is now rare and this places children of mixed marriages in a difficult position 
(Chivvis and Dogo 111). Media sources have become increasingly tailored to different ethnic 
groups. According to Topic, a correspondent for an RS magazine, “ ‘the media spread hatred, 
and interpersonal relations are deteriorating…People travel less in the other entity, and a large 
majority do not want members of each ethnic group to be their neighbors’” (Cain 2).  The result 
is frightening: “a newer generation of Bosnians may be even more inclined toward ethnic 
nationalism than their parents” (Chivvis and Dogo 111). Additionally, younger respondents to a 
survey said that they were less optimistic about living with people of other ethnicities than their 
parents (Stover 117). 
One way of dealing with the past is locating, exhuming and identifying the remains of 
missing persons. As Clark argues, this may be one of the most critical obstacles to reconciliation 
(“Missing Persons” 425). The ICMP believe there are 30,000 missing persons from the conflict 
in BiH. 13,000 have been correctly identified but between 7000-8000 were misidentified because 
traditional methods were used. Traditional methods refer to making identifications based on 
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clothing and objects located on the remains or in the grave. This has been corrected through the 
use of DNA analysis that began in 2001. According to Keough, Simmons, and Samuels, the 
failure to identify missing persons causes their families to be “ ‘suspended in a ‘no-man’s land’ 
of psychological and spiritual existence’” (qtd. in J. N. Clark, “Missing Persons” 429). Missing 
persons prevent families from moving forward, prolong the trauma of families, and fuel 
interethnic mistrust (J. N. Clark, “Missing Persons” 429). Since such a large number of missing 
persons remain unidentified, many families of victims have not begun the process of 
reconciliation.  
As mentioned earlier, the ICMP is responsible for recovering and identifying the remains 
of missing persons. Their employees often work in very challenging environments. On July 27, 
2010, ICMP workers were shot at while excavating a mass grave of Bosniac victims that was 
uncovered in Perucac Lake (BBC)25. The town lies on the border between BiH and Serbia. It was 
clear that they were not welcome there.   
Ethnic cleansing created ethnic enclaves. The emphasis of the international community 
on return, without programs to promote interaction between different ethnic groups, has also led 
to divisions in communities that are predominately one ethnic group. Minority returnees who 
return to their pre-war locations find that they are now in the minority ethnic group. These 
returnees fear for violence and forced assimilation in their communities and subsequently isolate 
themselves which, leads to ethnic enclaves in mixed communities. This has negatively impacted 
reconciliation efforts.  
Lastly, the divided education system, to be described later in this paper, indicates the 
generational lack of reconciliation. This is evident not only in the physical segregation of 
students but also in the use of ethnically specific curricula especially with respect to history. 
There is no consensus as to how history should be taught. In a UNDP study in June 2005 when 
asked how to preserve a historical record of the war, 32.4% of respondents said that this should 
be addressed in history books, while 26.6% said that the events should not be addressed for the 
next 20 years (Priesner, O’Donoghue and Dedic 126).  
From these indicators it is clear that reconciliation has been absent from the 
reconstruction process in BiH. Reconciliation can have a significant impact on civil society, local 
capacity, security and return of refugees and IDPs. Additionally, reconciliation can impact and 
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be impacted by the education system; that is their relationship is consequential. The importance 
of education systems as they relate to reconciliation will be discussed in the following section. 
IV. Education Systems 
Education has a dual role to play in post-conflict settings. On the one hand, it can directly 
affect the success of post-conflict reconstruction by determining whether there will be an 
educated workforce capable of supporting economic recovery. On the other hand, education can 
have a less direct impact by influencing reconciliation, which in turn affects reconstruction. As 
Smith argues, education can be a tool for ideological development, provide knowledge and skills 
which promote economic development and it can be “a means by which social and cultural 
values are transmitted from generation to generation and, depending on the values concerned, 
these may convey negative stereotypes or encourage attitudes that explicitly or implicitly 
condone violence or generate conflict” (22). Education in post-conflict settings helps to bring 
normalcy, democracy and economic recovery (Trnavcevic 99) and can be a “mechanism for 
social change, by identifying the sources of conflict and developing strategies to ameliorate them” 
(Hayes and McAllister 438). This means that education can maintain stability and encourage 
unity (Gallagher 429).  
 Perry argues that education is the key component to reconstruction in post-ethnic conflict 
settings.  It is a country’s “single most important social, economic and political resource. Schools 
educate youth for future employment, socialize children to ensure integration and active 
involvement in their communities, prepare them for productive participation as a citizen in their 
country and transmit those values and beliefs deemed to be important by their society” (Perry 2). 
More broadly, education for life-skills promotes “learning knowledge, learning to do, learning to 
be, and learning to live together” (Dubois and Trabelsi 58). 
 Smith has identified three dimensions of the development of education in post-conflict 
settings: physical, ideological and psychological (19-29). In the first dimension, education in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict will focus on material reconstruction (Davies 229). Schools are 
rebuilt and teachers and administrative workers to staff the school are identified. The second 
dimension refers to a shift in ideology towards the democratization of education and preparing 
teachers through training for post-conflict education. Lastly, psychological reconstruction means 
addressing loss of trust and mental health concerns of students. How these phases are 
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implemented will depend on how education is incorporated into the first step of the 
reconstruction process, the Peace Agreement. 
a. Education and Peace Agreements 
 
There is a lack of consensus as to the way in which education should be addressed and 
subsequently implemented in peace agreements. According to Nikolai, during emergencies, 
securing basic necessities is prioritized over education (33-50). It is clear that humanitarian aid to 
provide things like food, water, and shelter is very important in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict. However, as mentioned earlier, peace agreements must address both the short-term and 
long-term goals of reconstruction. Therefore, not only should education be considered in any 
peace agreement, but also it should be viewed in terms of both a short-term humanitarian need as 
well as a long-term development goal. Complications may arise if education systems were 
implicated in the conflict. However, regardless of these complications, by incorporating 
education into the peace agreement, there is an increased chance that the sector will “receive 
attention after a conflict and that the impact of the conflict on the education system will be 
addressed as well as the role that education may have played in the outbreak of conflict” (Dupuy 
161). This indicates a concern for education for the long term.  
Dupuy argued that there are four ways in which education can be framed in peace 
agreements: as a security issue, as a protection issue, as an economic issue, and as a 
sociopolitical issue (157). Each issue falls under a broader phase or transition within post-
conflict reconstruction. Some are more related to short-term goals others to long-term goals. By 
emphasizing education within these reconstruction transitions, education is thus framed 
developmentally and progressively. Additionally the role of education is enhanced when it is 
incorporated into multiple components to the peace agreement.  
b. Education and Reconstruction  
 
 As mentioned earlier, the phases of post-conflict reconstruction should be considered 
consequentially. This implies that phases and transitions are intertwined and affect each other. 
This paper argues that education has a critical role to play in post-conflict settings. If the ultimate 
goal of reconstruction is to rebuild society in a sustainable way, then there are a number of steps 
in the reconstruction process that must occur. These steps must not ignore education.   
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 As noted above, education needs to be given a mandated role in any peace agreement that 
considers both short-term and long-term goals. In this way, education can impact many aspects 
of the reconstruction process. First, it can contribute to economic recovery by generating an 
educated workforce. In so doing, education can also affect the development of local capacity. 
Second, it can promote a civil society both by encouraging inter-ethnic interaction and by 
generating an educated electorate that can make informed decisions about political issues. As 
Torsti argues, education is an essential “long-term building block of a functional civil society’” 
(Tortsi, “Divergent” 334). Third, if education is successful in reducing inter-ethnic tensions, then 
security is enhanced and there is less chance of a return to conflict. This should encourage IDP 
and Refugee return. 
 It is the form of education, for example, integrated schools, that has the power to promote 
the kind of positive inter-ethnic interaction and a shared history that are both essential for 
reconciliation and reconstruction. If student interaction is positive, this will spread to the 
community as a whole fostering the development of a civil society. Education is seen as a “vital 
window of opportunity to rebuild positive peace” (Dupuy 162). If this window is missed, the 
consequences on societies trying rebuild are profound. An analysis of the case of Northern 
Ireland (NI) reveals how education can shape reconciliation. This relationship will be elaborated 
when the case of BiH is analyzed.  
c. Education and Reconciliation: The Case of Northern Ireland 
 
It has been shown that “‘ethnic attitudes are formed early, and that once positive or 
negative prejudices are formed, they tend to increase with time. Early socialization experiences 
are, therefore, critical in the formation of ethnic attitudes’” (qtd. in Perry 5). According to Magill, 
Smith and Hamber, two key components to achieving reconciliation are significant cultural and 
attitudinal changes and the development of a shared history (15-16). Divided education systems 
assist in the perpetuation of ethnic prejudices and therefore an absence of attitudinal changes. 
This is apparent in divided curricula but also in the absence of interaction between persons of 
different ethnic groups.  
Gallagher argues that, in NI, reform of the education system was used to address 
reconciliation (431). Education systems were seen to have the capacity to both perpetuate and 
ameliorate divisions in society. In the case of NI, education was given a mandate in the peace 
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agreement. The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement stated that “an essential aspect of the 
reconciliation process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society, 
including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education” (Gallagher 436).  
Bozic notes that, unfortunately, education has been used to perpetuate rather than 
ameliorate divisions between Catholics and Protestants (325). 95% of children attend segregated 
schools, and 80% of social housing is segregated indicating that segregation has permeated many 
areas of society even the youth of NI (McAleavy, Donegan and O'Hagen 541). This point is 
reiterated by Gallagher who argues that education did not confront the outcome of the existence 
of segregated schools, namely that they perpetuate divisions in the society (429).  
To address this issue, integrated education has been emphasized in post-conflict NI. 
However, according to 2008 data, only 6% of the population attended these integrated schools 
(Magill, Smith and Hamber 19). Integrated schools were introduced under the assumption that 
segregated schools both symbolize the different attitudes of Catholics and Protestants and lead to 
intolerance (Bozic 325). This argument is supported by Gallagher who claims that: “1) separate 
schools enhanced religious divisions by providing different curriculums that heightened inter-
group antagonism; 2) the mere fact of separation, allied with the hidden curriculum of separate 
schools, encouraged religious differences; and 3) the issue of separate schools was largely 
irrelevant, as the main basis for violent conflict lay in the unjust relationship of domination and 
subordination between the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland” (434). 
To summarize, in NI integrated schools were viewed as a way of reconciling Catholic 
and Protestant populations. However, they were not well attended and segregated schools 
continued to perpetuate divisions. While education was given a key place in the peace agreement 
and integrated education was encouraged, there was a lack of political will to enforce education 
reform. As stated earlier, education systems have the potential to ameliorate or perpetuate 
divisions. In the case of NI, due to the lack of political will, education was used for the latter. 
Regardless, Hayes and McAllister argue that, even though it was not successful, integrated 
education was the place to start to address societal divisions and that this should be the case in 
other post-conflict societies such as BiH (448). A force of politicians, parents, and school 
directors, who have themselves reconciled, must be present to support integrated education, if 
education systems are to ameliorate divisions. This is dependent on the long-term projection of 
the education system, in this case its projection for reform.  
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d. The Education System in BiH 
i. History of Education System in BiH 
The education system has undergone significant changes over the past century. During 
Austro-Hungarian control, “each ethnic group - Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs - struggled for and 
gained autonomy in education affairs as a means to preserve and protect their respective 
identities, in effect giving schools a strong ethno-confessional character” (Bozic 323). While the 
education system was united under socialist Yugoslavia, history and language were still 
controversial subjects. President Tito did create a common curriculum and students learned both 
Cyrillic and Latin alphabets (Chivvis and Dogo 111). Between 1990 and 1992, after the collapse 
of the former Yugoslavia, the curricula became increasingly politicized as politicians of the three 
main groups used it as a tool to create divisions. With the onset of war, education became strictly 
divided according to the locations of the frontlines; Bosnian Serb controlled areas used the 
Serbian curriculum, Bosnian Croat areas used the Croatian curriculum and Bosniac controlled 
areas developed their own curriculum (Torsti, “People’s Attitudes” 190). Education became a 
way to disperse propaganda and increase divides. This split in the education system was paired 
with the significant physical damage from the war. Around 60% of schools were damaged or 
completely destroyed (Perry 23).  
ii. DPA and Education 
As mentioned earlier, while the DPA ended the fighting in BiH, “the decentralized logic 
of Dayton has made education hostage to latent nationalism” (OECD 117). The DPA gave 
jurisdiction of the education system to the Ministry of Education at the entity level in the RS and 
at the cantonal level in the FBiH (Torsti, “People’s Attitudes” 190). The result is a highly 
centralized RS and a highly decentralized FBiH that has made the coordination of education 
challenging. While the state level Ministry of Civil Affairs is meant to oversee the two entities, 
the DPA gave no mandate to this Ministry to intervene in issues involving education and remains 
largely ineffective within the sector. Additionally, decisions at any level must be made by 
consensus, which is ‘very very challenging’.26  
Returning to the FBiH, the constitution allocated ‘making education policy, including 
decisions concerning the regulation and provision of education’ to the cantons of which five are 
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 Interview with BiH government official on 7/16/10. 
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majority Bosniac27, three Bosnian Croat28, and two mixed communities29 (Perry). Since cantonal 
ministers continue to resort to nationalistic/ethnically-based platforms, the result is that the 
cantons developed ‘de facto’ Bosniac and Croat education systems (Bozic 321). In effect, then, 
the DPA have “institutionalized the war-time educational divisions” (Torsti, “Segregated 
Education” 67). 
iii. International Community Involvement  
According to Bozic, there are two forces working within the education system; they are 
politicization and fragmentation (320). Politicization has resulted in protectionism. The goal of 
protectionism is “to reinforce the national consciousness of a respective ethnic group and link it 
to a specific territory or territories and to exclude the other groups from its education system” 
(Bozic 320). Fragmentation is a direct result of the powers allocated under the DPA, since 
control of education was effectively decentralized.  
 On May 14, 1996, the World Bank (WB) announced its support of the Emergency 
Education Reconstruction Project. The WB contributed $10 million toward the total cost ($32 
million). An additional $5 million from both the Trust Fund for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
International Development Association were given. This money went towards rebuilding 
classrooms and providing teaching material in an effort to return students to the classrooms as 
quickly as possible.30 In 1997, a Second Emergency Education Reconstruction Project for BiH 
was approved. An additional $11 million was given to the project. This project continued to 
build on the previous goals31 and expanded to try to “help develop an appropriate process of 
education finance and administration, to build government implementation capacity to plan and 
deliver education programs at different government levels, and to facilitate communication and 
cooperation on education issues within the Federation, and between the Federation and the Serb 
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 Una-Sana, Tuzla-Podrinje, Zenica-Doboj, Bosna Drina-Gorazde and Sarajevo. 
28
 Posavina, Western Herzegovina, and Livno-Tomislav. 
29
 Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva (Mostar). 
30
 More specifically the funding went to rebuilding 70 primary schools, building five new primary schools, printing 
and distributing textbooks to primary schools in the Federation, equipping primary schools in the Federation with 
basic education materials, and providing assistance to the Ministries of Education so that they could successfully 
implement the project. Please see 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=34370&piPK=34424&theSitePK=4607&menuPK=34463
&contentMDK=20013476. 
31
 More specifically, reconstruction of primary schools in the Federation, seven primary schools in the RS, 
equipment and furniture for the classrooms, textbooks and educational materials in the federation. Please see 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40941&Projecti
d=P045313.  
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Republic.”32 As can be seen, the initial support to the education sector was financially based and 
did not include provisions for the long-term. While the program was successful in rebuilding the 
infrastructure of the education system, it was not successful in this expanded goal because of the 
gridlock created by the DPA.  
In 1998, OHR created a working group to address the problem of hate speech found in 
history textbooks. The Agreement on the Removal of Objectionable Material33 from Textbooks 
to be used in BiH in the 1999-2000 school year was signed in 1999 (J. N. Clark, “Education” 
348). The initiative has been implemented but not to the extent intended. For example, there are 
cases when material in the textbook deemed to be hate speech was covered incompletely by 
black markers or stickers. Additionally, this peaked the interest of students, “who doubtlessly be 
stirred to exercise their lively minds on what lies beneath the opaque black ink” (Lo-Beer). There 
are also cases where this material was removed from the textbooks but then hung on school 
bulletin boards. Therefore, there was a discrepancy between the intention and the implementation 
of the agreement.  
The International Community34 became more involved in education in 2000, when it 
advocated for the creation of the ‘two-schools-under-one-roof’ system (note: this will be 
elaborated on below). This role expanded in 2002, when the International Community 
acknowledged that education had a large role to play and began reform efforts. This started when 
the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) took over the education 
portfolio.35 The goal was for the OSCE to play a coordinating role for international efforts in the 
sector. However, OSCE had no mandate as education was only mentioned in the DPA as a right 
with no elaboration on how that right was to be enforced. According to Perry, “… the lack of a 
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 Please see 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40941&Projecti
d=P045313. 
33
 One example of ‘objectionable material’ is in istorija, the Bosnian Serb textbook: “Through the Catholic Church 
and its fanatical followers, the fight was led against the Orthodox religion and Serbs. It seemed almost as if the 
situation from 1941 was repeating. Serbian people had to move out of Croatia, Serbs were tortured and innocent 
people were killed in the same horrible way as 50 years ago. Entire Serbian villages were robbed and burnt down, 
the Orthodox churches were destroyed, and graves and sacred places desecrated” (Torsti, “History Textbooks” 80). 
Similar examples can be found in the Bosnian Croat curriculum. 
34
 Here, the International Community refers to multilateral donors (UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, EC, CoE, WB, 
OECD, OSCE), international NGOs (Save the Children, Norwegian Education for Peace, OSF) and some individual 
countries.  
35
 The education portfolio involves: access to education for all, and non-discrimination; improving quality and 
modernization of pre-school, primary, and secondary education; structures for financing and management of 
education; and reform of the legal framework for education. Please see http://www.berghof-
conflictresearch.org/documents/publications/daytone_fischera_edu.pdf. 
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specific mandate in the peace agreement denied education the legitimacy of inclusion and the 
dedicated help of a designed responsible body” (42). 
There have also been initiatives made by other international organizations. The Council 
of Europe (CoE) has tried to use its power to create requirements dealing with the education, as 
precursors for Bosnian accession into the European Union. The CoE has focused specifically on 
the teaching of history for the 1992-1995 period.  In 1999, the CoE set the requirement for the 
removal of “potentially offensive material from textbooks” (Torsti, “People’s Attitudes” 193).  
The OSCE has been successful with several initiatives. The first was the Framework Law 
on Primary and Secondary education in 2003, which created a Common Core Curriculum and 
repeated the call for the removal of offensive material in textbooks (Torsti, “People’s Attitudes” 
192)  (Fischer 306). However, there is often a gap between policy and practice. In fact the 
Framework Law created a dispute, which triggered several cantonal ministers to invoke ‘vital 
national interests.’ As such, vital national interests are “just an excuse for lack of action, 
preserving the status quo and in fact have very little to do with the real situation.”36 Cantons have 
continued to refuse total implementation of the law. The lack of political will on the part of these 
actors to make necessary reforms has meant that successful reforms have often been completed 
“in spite of instead of because of local actors”.37 In 2004, OHR had to intervene to impose the 
necessary amendments to the constitution so that this law was fully implemented (Fischer 307). 
Other international organizations that have conducted assessments of the education system 
“…have concluded that the quality of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina is very low 
compared to international standards and criteria, and there is little coordination in all levels of 
education” (Torsti, “People’s Attitudes” 192). According to a survey conducted by the Open 
Society Fund (OSF), “segregation and discrimination have become established social facts in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina” (qtd. in Torsti, “People’s Attitudes” 192). This segregation has continued 
for a generation, which has led to challenges in the development of an all-inclusive multicultural 
society.  
iv. Indicators of Segregation and Division in Education 
The overarching concept behind the current education system is “equal but separate” 
(Kreso 357). According to Bozic, there are three forms of segregation: “(1) ‘two schools under 
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 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 1/27/11. 
37
 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 2/3/11. Quoted with permission.   
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one roof,’ (2) busing children to mono-ethnic schools, (3) and teaching of so called ‘national 
subjects’” (326). These categories can be further divided to create a total of five manifestations 
of ethnic division.  
a. ‘Two-Schools-Under-One-Roof’  
The phenomenon of ‘two schools under one roof’ resulted from the lack of physical space 
available for schooling and from an early initiative by the OSCE and the OHR to promote 
minority return.  These organizations supported this ‘temporary fix’ initiative assuming that the 
system of ‘parallelism’ would increase return of refugees and IDPs, which was seen as an 
important condition for economic development. The idea was to allow minority returnees who 
often resorted to schooling within private households to be moved into the local school building 
(OSCE 22). It is important to note that ‘two schools under one roof’ are “symbolic of the broader 
problems of this country… they are the most blatant ones.”38 The reality is that every school in 
the country, except for those in Brcko, fosters “segregatory practices because they exist for one 
group of people.”39 
The first ‘two-schools-under-one-roof’ was established in 2000. In just three years, the 
phenomenon spread, leading to the creation of fifty-two schools located primarily in the Zenica-
Doboj Canton, Central Bosnia Canton and the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (Bozic 328). This 
represents 18% of a total of 289 secondary schools in BiH.40  The number of schools currently 
defined within this category is disputed. The Ministry of Civil Affairs of the FBiH claims that 
there are only thirty-two schools that are ‘two-schools-under-one-roof’; eleven in the 
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, thirteen in the Central-Bosnia Canton and eight in the Zenica-
Doboj Canton. On the other hand, the NGO Schueler Helfen Leben reports that there are fifty-
two, confirming Bozic’s figure (Leben). As stated above, these schools are only present in the 
ethnically mixed cantons within the FBiH.  
There are several different forms of this phenomenon. Most commonly, students from 
different ethnic groups attend classes in the same building but follow different curricula and can 
be divided physically by walls or schoolyard fences. These institutions also have segregated 
school boards and administrations. It can also mean that students attend the same building and 
classrooms and follow different curricula, but come to school in shifts. For example, Croat 
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 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 2/3/11. Quoted with permission. 
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 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 2/3/11. Quoted with permission. 
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 Please see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm. 
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students attend school in the morning with a Croat flag on the roof, then at lunchtime, the flag is 
switched, and Bosniac students enter the premises to attend classes in the afternoon (Leben).   
 
b. Mono-Ethnic Schools  
This phenomenon of ‘two schools under one roof’ has also affected other areas of society. 
These schools typically have branch schools that are mono-ethnic in nature (OSCE 22). Branch 
schools tend to be filled with minority returnee students and have fewer resources than the main 
schools which contain the majority students. In reality, these branch schools become the ‘de 
facto’ two in one system. Students who attend mono-ethnic schools do not interact with students 
from other ethnic groups and in some cases the location of these mono-ethnic schools contributes 
to the segregation of the communities.  
c. The Busing Phenomenon 
The second major indicator of segregation and division is the busing phenomenon. This is 
the illegal practice of crossing administrative boundaries in order for children to attend schools in 
which they are part of the majority. Students are supposed to attend schools in their catchment 
area regardless of the ethnic make up of the school. Busing children to mono-ethnic schools is 
“an instrument for segregation present in both entities” (Bozic 333). Parents who can afford to do 
so will send their children to another municipality, Canton or Entity, avoiding their catchment 
area, in order for their children to attend a school in which they are in the majority. The most 
common reason given by parents for this practice is the lack of curriculum choice. For example, 
minority students do not want to attend religion class of another ethnic group. In reality, parents 
fear that their children will be isolated, attacked, or forced to assimilate, which is the same 
justification for the ‘two schools under one roof’ system. According to OSCE, “this works 
against two of the international community’s highest priorities – the promotion of reconciliation 
among the nations of the state and the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of 
origins” (OSCE 6).   
d. Forced Assimilation 
For those who cannot afford to bus their children, the fear of forced assimilation has 
become a reality. The OSCE has identified several cases of forced assimilation of minority 
children in majority schools. For example, “a Serb child, the only one of his ethnicity in the 
entire school, passes each day through an entrance bearing a plaque that commemorates a well 
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known war criminal who killed many Serbs. The child sits at the back of the Islamic religion 
class, because he does not want to wander alone in the corridor”41. Also, there have been cases 
where these types of students have to sit in unheated hallways during the winter while the class is 
being conducted. Thus, where the curriculum only serves the majority group, the fears of the 
minority students and parents become realized.  
e. The Curricula 
The curricula, designed to accommodate each of the three ethnic groups, has further 
encouraged divisions. Each curriculum has an ‘ethnocentric focus’ which has resulted in 
competing versions of the truth (J. N. Clark, “Education” 348). Curricula reform is a 
controversial subject involving both their content and structure. In 2002, the Interim Agreement 
on Accommodation of Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children established the ‘national 
group of subjects’. These are language, literature, history, geography (also known as ‘nature and 
society’), and religious instruction. The Interim Agreement identified the subjects seen to “be of 
vital interest to the three constituent peoples and an important medium for transmitting essential 
cultural values” (Perry 33). This initiative unified the structure of the curricula despite the 
differing contents. Unfortunately, the same initiative has allowed for the promotion of divisions, 
stereotypes, and “questionable historical interpretations and cultural myths” (Perry 33).  
It is important to note, that there are three national languages within BiH. Serbian, 
Croatian, and Bosnian, while very similar, are strongly connected to ethnic identity. Additionally, 
there are two national alphabets: Cyrillic and Latin. In the former Yugoslavia, there was only one 
language, Serbo-Croatian. Therefore, each ethnic group could and still can understand the other. 
According to Clark, “what was once a single language has now been artificially molded into 
three separate languages” (“Education” 350). This is why language was included as a ‘vital 
interest’ in the Interim Agreement. However, linguistic rights have been used to justify 
segregation.  
One example of curriculum bias, given by student at the SHL youth seminar, was the 
geography course for Croat students at her school. These students learnt only about the 
geography of Croatia and they were taught that their capital was Zagreb not Sarajevo. This was 
reiterated by Torsti’s analysis of the curricula. According to Karge, “Croat textbooks referred 
mainly to Croatia proper as the point of departure” (Torsti, “People’s Attitudes” 194). In a 
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 Taken from a PowerPoint presentation used by an international organization during a meeting in BiH on 6/18/10. 
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similar way, Bosnian Serbs place an emphasis on Serbia leaving Bosniacs as the only ones who 
placed BiH as the center of their history and geography. This may be because the textbooks for 
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs largely originate in Croatia and Serbia respectively even 
though this practice was banned.  
It is important here to look specifically at historical textbooks as another indicator of 
division. Davies says that “who controls history and memory is key to conflict” (237). Ethnic 
post-conflict settings tend to place a larger emphasis on history education. In the case of BiH, the 
war was fueled by propaganda, which cited historic conflicts committed by the other ethnic 
groups. Differential ethnic amnesia is a key problem in history teaching; that is, covering up the 
past by either not teaching it or teaching it only in part, is “a significant impediment to the 
building of interethnic trust and thus to reconciliation itself” (J. N. Clark, “Education” 348). 
Additionally, as mentioned earlier there were cases prior to the Agreement that aimed to remove 
hate speech, where textbooks contained rhetoric that demonized and blamed other ethnic groups 
for the war, at the same time describing their own ethnic group as the victim. Many of the 
textbooks denied that their ethnic group was complicit in committing war crimes. Therefore, it is 
clear that history teaching can promote ethnic distance and exacerbate divisions if not handled 
properly. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, despite the removal of ‘objectionable material,’ 
between 2000-2001, only a portion of history textbooks were reprinted (Torsti, “History 
Textbooks” 80).  
A memorandum of understanding42 was proposed by the OSCE with the CoE and the 
Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research to develop guidelines for geography 
and history textbooks.43 In 2004, two commissions were formed to begin the research. The RS 
minister of education has still not signed the memorandum and even though the FBiH ministers 
are ready to move forward there is no state-level enforcing agency to create uniform standards 
for implementation.44  
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 The principles outlined in this memorandum were the following: BiH as the main reference point; promoting the 
basic understanding of the history of all three constituent peoples and national minorities; disputed interpretations 
will be explained appropriately; and neighboring countries will be presented as impartial actors. Please see 
http://www.osce.org/bih/57453. 
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 Please see http://www.osce.org/bih/57453. 
44
 Please see http://www.osce.org/bih/57453. 
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v. Obstacles to Integrated Education 
a. Consequences of the Interim Agreement  
The Interim Agreement “acknowledges ‘the increasing number of returnee families, their 
constitutional rights and the right of their children to receive adequate education, and having in 
mind that the lack of it is often quoted as one of the main obstacles for return…” (Bozic 331). 
Adequate education here means ‘ethnically correct’ education (Bozic 326). In this way, the 
Interim Agreement initiative has fostered segregation particularly in the way that the ‘national 
subjects’ were defined. A report published by the Open Society Foundation found that the 
“national group of subjects and religious education textbooks support segregation in society. In 
fact, they are essentially mono-national and do not provide students with knowledge and skills 
for life in a multicultural society” (Fund 203). 
The international community recognizes the right of minority groups “to education in 
their mother tongue according to their cultural and religious beliefs, respecting and promoting 
school, community, and national pluralism” (Bozic 330). This would suggest that it is not only a 
right, but also both acceptable and encouraged to be educated in distinct ways according to your 
ethnic identity. This was important during UNHCR’s efforts concerning the return of refugees, 
particularly minority returnees.  
While both instruction according to one’s ethnic identity and the ‘two schools under one 
roof system did create a safe and friendly environment for returnees in the first few years after 
the war, the number of minority returnees has gone down significantly with each year since the 
end of the war. This implies that there is no longer a need for such a system. As Bozic predicted, 
however, the side effects of this system have had long-term effects.  
b. Political Influence 
One of the major obstacles to education reform is the lack of political will. This has been 
made possible because of the DPA. The DPA were good for ending the war but not for building 
up the country in the aftermath of war. Instead, they have institutionalized divisions and friction 
between the ethnic groups making compromise seem a weakness. If the primary goal of 
politicians is to appeal to their political base, then they will push for divisions in order to 
continue to hold power. For example, Greta Kuna, the Minister of Education of the Central 
Bosnia Canton said publically and without qualms, “we shouldn’t put apples and pears together. 
Put pears where pears are and apples where apples are” (Leben). To many, they do not see these 
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indicators as segregation but rather as actions to ‘maintain cultural identities.’45 Additionally, 
Croatia and Serbia and some religious groups, continue to fund, both monetarily and through the 
supplying of textbooks, ethnically divided schools.46 There was an opportunity for change to the 
system in the recent elections in October 2010. However, the push for more power at the state 
level, including centralized control over education, continues to be rejected by the RS and FBiH. 
Increased compromise between the entities and coordination with the cantons is hindered by 
ethnic rhetoric.  
vi. The Result  
The reality is that “segregation in education and history teaching have continued for a 
generation, causing many problems for the development of a multicultural society” (Torsti, 
“Segregated Education” 65). The result is frightening and according to a leading education 
official, may be irreparable.47 In a recent report by UNICEF, it was stated that “about 15% of 
pupils surveyed in one of the study-related municipalities had no information at all about the 
other peoples” which indicates that there is a “complete absence of communication between the 
various ethnic groups and a lack of action on the part of school authorities within the context of 
their role and responsibility to promote tolerance and understanding of others and ethnic 
differences” (13). Students have not been “taught to stop hating and fearing the other.”48 Almost 
two decades has gone by, allowing a generation of students to go through a system, which has 
created a divided society. The longer the segregatory and divided education system is in place, 
the more individuals have become accustomed to it. Unfortunately, it is now seen as normal and 
overall, there is less momentum for actors to reform.49 Lastly, “all the money that we [the 
international community] have been spending on different elements of post-war reconstruction 
will amount to nothing if you have a future citizenship that is growing up thinking that they are 
three separate sets of citizens.”50 The education system has contributed to the lack of 
reconciliation but also to the failure of the reconstruction process.  
                                                        
45
 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 7/19/10.  
46
 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 7/19/10. 
47
 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH 1/27/11. Quoted with permission.  
48
 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH 2/3/11. Quoted with permission. 
49
 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH on 7/20/10. 
50
 Interview with a leading education official at an NGO in BiH 2/3/11. 
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V. Conclusion  
 
According to Minow, “in the absence of positive experiences with people of other groups, 
it is difficult to overcome prejudices and stereotypes” (qtd. in Haider, “(Re) Imagining 
Coexistence” 101). Additionally, as stated earlier, early socialization experiences are important 
to the formation of ethnic attitudes. Clark takes this further by suggesting that, until segregation 
and division are removed from the education system and “replaced with integration and inclusion, 
the prospects for genuine reconciliation remain somewhat remote” (“Education” 344). This is 
because education is the key vehicle for achieving rehumanization of the ‘other’ and building 
inter-ethnic trust, two parts to the multidimensional definition of reconciliation (J. N. Clark, 
“Education” 345). Based on the analysis of the education sector in BiH it is clear that segregation 
and division in the education system has contributed to the lack of reconciliation. As it stands 
now, education is a major obstacle to reconciliation. 
 There are two mechanisms in an education system that can impact reconciliation: its form 
and its content. The ideal form would be an integrated education system. It has been shown that, 
consistent with the contact hypothesis, social interaction promotes the breaking down of ethnic 
divisions (Clore, Bray, Itkin, and Murphy 107-116). In other words, bringing children of 
different ethnicities under the same roof and into the same classrooms has the potential to reduce 
tension, remove prejudices and stereotypes, and encourage inter-ethnic interaction and promote 
trust.  
 The ideal content of an education system would be inclusive and non-biased; that is, the 
curricula would be unified into a single curriculum, used by all ethnic groups. This would 
suggest a shared truth has been developed and accepted. This new curriculum would focus more 
on what students need to learn to be successful in society rather than on what they need to learn 
to be good members of their ethnic group. Religious education could still be provided separately. 
However, all other courses from the national group of subjects, language, literature, history, and 
geography, should be taught based on the same common curriculum and with students in the 
same physical space.  
 The absence of reconciliation due to the segregated and divided education system has in 
turn prevented successful reconstruction efforts from taking place in BiH. As was argued earlier, 
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reconciliation is key to achieving sustainable and successful reconstruction. The absence of 
reconciliation in BiH has impeded the reconstruction process.  
 Returning to the overall framework of the paper, the reason for these failures lies in the 
fact that long-term plans for education were not included the peace agreement. The absence of 
this provision meant that no mandate was given to an international organization or to the state 
level of government. As a result, initiatives for educational reform were delayed. Education 
quickly became politicized allowing it to be used by politicians interested in preserving divisions 
and the salience of ethnicity. Because the constitution was not given an end date or a timeline for 
reform, politicians are able to continue their hold on the education system.  
 To conclude, the ideal post-conflict setting would construct a peace agreement that 
considers both the long-term and short-term goals to reconstruction. A constitution is necessary, 
however caution must be taken to ensure that the document is transitional and that a fixed date to 
reform the constitution or even remove it from the peace agreement is considered. Furthermore, 
the progression from short-term to long-term reconstruction goals must consider the 
development of local capacity. That is, if the peace agreement is mandated by the international 
community, care must be given to allocate power to the local community, increasing local 
ownership and subsequently, assuring the success of the reconstruction process. Even if 
determining who or what constitutes the local community is challenging in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict, determining what and when components to the reconstruction process 
will be allocated to local actors must be placed in the peace agreement. Lastly, specific 
provisions for the education system must be included in the peace agreement. All components to 
the reconstruction process are consequential; that is each has the potential to impact every other 
component in the process. In the case of education, the paper has argued that both its form and 
content can promote reconciliation, economic development, civil society, local capacity, the 
political system, security and return which are all components to successful and sustainable 
reconstruction (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic Representation of the Influence of Education on Reconstruction 
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effective and the arbitrariness of the divisions becomes apparent when you see children of 
different ethnic groups interacting and even forming friendships in this environment.  
 The second NGO has tried to encourage the breaking down of divisions and segregation 
both by using the education system and by removing students from this setting. Schueler Helfen 
Leben (SHL) is a German NGO that focuses on integrating students at ‘two schools under one 
roof’. SHL employees go to these schools to strengthen student councils. In so doing, they try to 
integrate the councils so that students work together for a common goal. This effort has not been 
without setbacks. While SHL does not explicitly state that the program is to promote interaction 
between students of different ethnic groups, many politicians, school directors and parents have 
become aware of their intentions and have tried to obstruct their entrance into these schools. SHL 
has other programs, however, which remove students from these settings. For example, they hold 
youth seminars at the SHL house located just outside of Sarajevo. This empowers the students by 
giving them increased education about a subject that interests them, and then encourages them to 
go back to their communities to promote change or to share with others what they learned. The 
program also offers small grants to students to pursue projects in their communities. One SHL 
employee stated that without an active youth in communities across BiH, divisions will 
continue.51 Students who attend these seminars are always from different ethnic groups. In this 
way, students are able to work together, discuss, debate, and form friendships with students from 
other ethnic communities.  
Open Fun and SHL have been successful because they have identified one of the reasons 
for the absence of reconciliation; that is, lack of contact with students from different ethnic 
groups. They have removed the students from the environment that obstructs reconciliation; that 
is, the influence of politicians, parents, and school directors. This results in students being placed 
in a new environment where conversation, friendship, fun, etc., can flourish with people from 
different ethnic groups.  
The success of these programs highlights the arbitrary nature of these divisions. To 
prevent other post-conflict settings from falling into the same trap that characterizes BiH, 
education must not only be incorporated into the peace agreement, but also seen as a critical 
component during all phases of reconstruction.  
  
                                                        
51
 Interview a leading education official at an NGO on 7/20/10. 
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